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ABSTRACT

FAILING AT COLLEGE FOOTBALL REFORM:
THE JAN KEMP TRIAL AT THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
by
Michael J. Fulford

Throughout the history of college football, there have been efforts to reform the
system and stop improprieties, yet conflict between gaining academic and athletic
prowess at colleges remained a central theme. In the 1980s, the Jan Kemp trial involving
the University of Georgia demonstrated this clash between revenue-generating athletics
and academic integrity. This historical study is an in-depth analysis of archives, legal
documents, interviews, and other textual evidence that demonstrated how the factors
surrounding the Jan Kemp case evolved and how key administrators and faculty members
reacted to pressure related to academic and athletic conflicts. An analysis of past reform
efforts in college football identified presidential control, commercialization of athletics,
and corruption of the student-athlete ideal through preferential treatment as the key issues
universities must address in relation to their football programs. An analysis of the
University of Georgia in relation to these issues showed that pressure to increase revenue
from football led to a lack of presidential control over academic-athletic conflicts and
allowed preferential treatment of athletes to persist at the expense of academic integrity.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
From the beginning, fans and boosters have driven college football and to a point
where it exudes a tremendous level of power on college campuses today. The 80,000
screaming fans in a stadium watching 22 young men playing football exemplifies the
popularity of this sport. The combination of spectators and money has created a powerful
enterprise. In his book, Rammer Jammer Yellow Hammer, Warren St. John described
the love for college football in Alabama like this, “To understand what absolute minority
non-fans are in Alabama, consider this: they are outnumbered there by atheists.”1
Football is arguably the most popular and most influential sport in the United
States of America (US). In Lawrenceville, GA, about 40 miles from the University of
Georgia (UGA), the Board of Regents (BoR) opened a new college, Georgia Gwinnett
College. In his proposal to the county commissioners concerning plans for the future of
the college, President Daniel Kaufman quipped, “the parking lot of a nearby Wal-Mart
Supercenter would be the perfect location for a football field.”2 Kaufman’s statement
may be more a prophecy than a joke. Since the first intercollegiate football game
between Princeton and Rutgers in 1869, football has become a major component of the
perception and culture of college. Football has been used as a public relations tool to

1

Warren St. John, Rammer Jammer Yellow Hammer (New York: Crown, 2004), pp.1-2. A poll done by
the Mobile Register showed 90% of the state’s citizens described themselves as college football
fans.
2
Young, Camie, “College Planning Future of Campus” Gwinnett Daily Post. Sunday February 11, 2007,
sec. A, p. 10.

1

2
increase exposure for colleges and increase revenue in the form of tuition, donations,
tickets, and licensing. However, few football programs bring in millions of dollars and
there are many others that lose money. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) recognizes different levels of competition, called divisions. The majority of
revenue-producing sports are in what the NCAA calls Division I-A, and within this
division, the largest revenue-producing schools play football. In the NCAA’s 2004-2006
study of revenues and expenses at Division I-A institutions, 19 out of the 119 institutions
that make up the Football Bowl Subdivision had a positive net revenue during that time
period.
The average net generated revenues for those surplus programs in
2006 was $4,291,000, while the average net deficit for the remaining
(deficit) programs was $8,923,000. The gap between the financially
successful programs ($13,214,000 in 2006) and others continues to
broaden and has almost doubled since 2004.3
The study showed that football does bring in a lot of money, but in the end, the
majority of the institutions participating in intercollegiate athletics are running on a
deficit and need additional revenue from the university to at least break-even. For those
colleges where football does produce revenue, the effect and influence it has on the
institution is even stronger. At many colleges and universities with revenue-producing
football programs, the athletic department reports directly to the president. Athletic
directors and football coaches have complex contracts that include television revenue and
exemption clauses. Provosts and vice-presidents are rarely compensated at the same
level or receive a similar level of attention from the institution’s chief executive. On
Saturdays in the fall, stadiums are filled with students, faculty members, staff members,

3

Daniel Fulks. NCAA 2004-2006 Revenues and Expenses of Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs
Report. (Indianapolis, IN:NCAA, March 2008). p. 13.
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alumni and alumnae, and other fans cheering and showing school spirit. Outside the
stadium, there is trash from tailgating, broken bottles, vomit, vandalism, and other forms
of activities that might create student, faculty, staff, alumni and alumnae, and community
outrage were it not a football game day. I know this because I have been a participant in
the culture as a student, a fan, and an alumnus of the University of Georgia. Having lived
the life as a fanatic, attending football games, screaming at opposing players, and holding
football up on a pedestal in relation to my life, I decided I needed to understand this
perspective I share with others and my perspective as a researcher in higher education to
see where there is congruence or contrast. Part of what I learned is the undesirable
effects of football reach beyond the stadium and into the classroom. Football provides a
critical juncture where the commercialization and promotion of intercollegiate athletics
conflicts with the academic integrity of an institution.
Preferential treatment of athletes and academic abuses are not uncommon at
universities with college football. The revenue and exposure that athletics brings to a
university creates situations where superstar high school athletes who do not meet the
general standards for admission to an institution are given special treatment. Wealthy
boosters pay exceptional athletes cash, cars, and other gifts as incentives for coming and
staying at their university.4 Examples of preferential treatment can be found regularly
and are a continuous topic in the news. Athletes failing a class have grades changed
while other athletes are guided by coaches to take easier classes in order to retain athletic
eligibility. The legitimacy of a college athlete’s academic classes may be questioned due
to incidents like those that happened at the University of Georgia as recently as 2002. In

4

Murray Sperber, College Sports Inc.: The Athletic Depatment versus the University (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 1990).
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the particular incident, the University of Georgia college basketball program was
suspended and coaches were fired when it was found that athletes were taking a class on
basketball.5 Some of the tests included questions such as, how many goals are on a
basketball court?6
Despite new scandals, commercialization of college football continues and the
sport still thrives. Programs that face the NCAA’s so-called death penalty are able to
survive abolition and rebuild after time.7 With each new scandal, the NCAA and other
administrators tinker and tweak the system. However, athletic programs and universities
adapt to the changes and find other ways to gain a competitive edge. Corruption
continues, athletes receive special treatment, and the money surrounding college football
increases for the few most successful football programs. Richard Ensberger, a writer and
editor at Newsweek magazine, summarizes the conflict between athletics and academics
that arises due to the enormous amount of money generated from college football at
southern schools like the University of Georgia:
While some university administrators are in thrall to the football program, others
have fought mostly losing battles to reign in overzealous boosters or coaches
who’ve cut ethical corners to keep the football team on the fast track.8
The breadth and depth of corruption in intercollegiate athletics in relation to academic
integrity has grown since the inception of the game. Throughout the history of college
football, there have been efforts to reform the system and stop improprieties, yet the

5

Deepika Rao, “University Report Confirms Allegations, “ The Red and Black, 3 March 2004.
J. Llewellyn, "Whose Ethics? Whose Leadership?," The Power of Management Capital (2003).
7
John Sayle Watterson, College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University, 2000), p. 374.
8
Richard Ernsberger, Jr., Bragging rights: a season in the SEC, (New York: M. Evans & Company, Inc.),
p. 10.
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conflict Ernsberger describes between gaining academic and athletic prowess at a college
remains a central theme.9
The Jan Kemp trial at the University of Georgia uncovered academic abuses and
unethical behavior that continued for years to keep key athletes eligible to play football
for the university. Jan Kemp was a Developmental Studies professor at the University of
Georgia who spoke out against academic abuses and preferential treatment toward
athletes in the Developmental Studies program. Many of the students involved were
members of the football team.
On February 3, 1982, Jan Kemp was demoted from her position as Coordinator
of the English component in the Developmental Studies program. Subsequently, her
contract was non-renewed. Following the non-renewal of her faculty contract, she filed a
lawsuit against the Director of Developmental Studies, Leroy Ervin, and the VicePresident for Academic Affairs, Virginia Trotter. Kemp claimed that her demotion and
dismissal were a result of her speaking out against preferential treatment of athletes.10
Whether or not her actions were the real reason for her dismissal became an afterthought
during and after the trial. The role of college football at the University of Georgia and its
influence on the decisions of administrators and faculty members became the focus of the
trial and in the public media. The Jan Kemp trial at the University of Georgia
demonstrates the clash between revenue-generating athletics11 and academic integrity. In

9

John Sayle Watterson, College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University, 2000), p. 374.
10
Kemp, J., Interview by author, tape recording, November 22, 2006.
11
For the purposes of this study, revenue-generating athletics are considered sports that generate a
significant amount of money for the institution and specifically the athletic programs of the
university.
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addition, it provides insight into why a university activity in conflict with academic goals
is able to persist with essentially the same values and traditions that create conflict.
Research Questions
The Jan Kemp trial was not a sudden phenomenon; the events involving Jan Kemp
occurred over a span of nearly ten years. In addition, there are other factors that set the
stage for this case before Jan Kemp arrived at the University of Georgia and there are
suggestions that the University of Georgia continues to see the impact of this case in the
present. Scandals and controversy have been a part of college football throughout its
history. When these episodes in college football history occurred, the administrators
involved at the universities found themselves at different points on the continuum
between supporting academic integrity and supporting athletic prowess. Academic
integrity supporters insisted that football was secondary to the academic mission and that
academic standards should never be lowered for the sake of maintaining a competitive
advantage in football.12 In opposition to this camp, the athletic prowess camp focused on
the financial revenue, athletic prestige, and popularity that college football brought to the
university. These camps created the external and internal pressure that affected the
decisions made by administrators, faculty members, and students when they addressed
academic integrity issues involving athletics. Additionally, many of the people involved
found themselves caught in the crossfire of competing interests. Each time a new effort
to reform college football emerged, leaders of the effort were forced to address these two
camps. According to John Thelin, the major reform efforts in the history of college
football, beginning with the Carnegie Report of 1929, identified similar issues and similar

12

John Sayle Watterson, College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University, 2000), p. 374.
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solutions. These themes are presidential control, commercialization of athletics, and
corruption of the student-athlete ideal through preferential treatment.13 Presidential
control concerned the level of involvement the president of the institution had in
addressing decisions made about athletics. Commercialization of athletics involves
making decisions concerning the football program based on economic rewards and
through increasing revenue regardless of the impact on students or academic integrity.
Preferential treatment of athletes involves creating separate standards or offering
additional help to athletes in the form of lowered admission standards, changing grades,
and allowing extra time to complete assignments.14 Throughout this study, the following
research questions guided the analysis of historical data.
1. How did these themes play a role in the Jan Kemp trial and the relationship
between academic integrity and athletics?
2. What internal and external factors created an environment for this scandal and
how did it affect the decision making of key administrators?
Research Design
This is an historical study that utilized data collected from primary and secondary
sources of textual evidence and interviews. Primary sources included documents located
in the archives at the University of Georgia; files provided by J. Hue Henry, attorney for
Jan Kemp; and Jan Kemp’s personal files. Additional primary data were collected
through interviews with specific individuals that provided a unique internal perspective to
the phenomenon. The data were then analyzed for themes, patterns, and relationships

13
14

John Thelin, Games colleges play, Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996, p. 197.
John Thelin, Games colleges play, Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996.
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that provide an interpretation of the relationship between college football and academic
integrity at the University of Georgia.
James Key provides a definition of the historical method of research in education.
He states that researchers using the historical method “are interested in reporting events
and/or conditions that occurred in the past. An attempt is made to establish facts in order
to arrive at conclusions concerning past events or predict future events.”15 One form of
historical research design consists of identifying and defining a problem to be studied,
collecting evidence through primary and secondary sources, analyzing and evaluating the
data, formulating a hypothesis, and reporting the analysis of these findings. Key suggests
that evidence used for historical research needs to be criticized externally. External
criticism consists of authenticating the evidence for legitimacy. If the evidence is
considered legitimate, then the next step is to evaluate the accuracy of the data.
John and Jean Comaroff suggest that “texts must be understood within contexts
and equations of power and meaning must be assigned value.”16 This study involves a
court trial where individuals spoke on behalf of the plaintiff or defendant. According to
Comaroff, the data collected from the trial must be placed within the proper context of
when and where the statements were made as well as the actual meaning of the
statements. Last, the decisions made by administrators at the university must also be
analyzed from the perspective of political history. In particular, this study dealt with
what Peter Clarke described as “manipulation by elites.”17 This view of political history

15

16
17

Key, James, (1997) Research Design in Occupational Education. Oklahoma State University.
www.okstate.edu/agedcm4h/aged5980a/5980/newpage19.htm.
Comaroff, J. L., and J. Comaroff. Ethnography and the Historical Imagination: Westview Press, 1992.
Peter Clarke, "Ideas and Interests," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 12, no. 1 (1981).p. 47.
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focuses on how individual actors or groups gain and maintain power. Additionally, these
groups or individuals manipulate the system to preserve their agenda. The study utilized
a combination of primary and secondary sources. Evidence of this type allowed the
researcher to analyze the situation from multiple contexts that presented data situated at a
local level and provided evidence that addressed the larger context surrounding the
situation.
The University of Georgia archives have a number of collections related to the
Jan Kemp trial and other important files concerning key executives and committees. The
archives provided a blend of primary and secondary sources that were used to create a
context for the Jan Kemp case. Primary sources of information included agendas,
memoranda, and letters from the files of administrators at the University. In addition, the
archives provided secondary sources such as newspaper clippings and faculty newsletters.
Jan Kemp provided documents from her personal files including an unpublished
autobiography. In addition, Kemp agreed to sit for an interview to discuss her
experiences. J. Hue Henry, who served as Jan Kemp’s attorney and a key litigator in the
trial, granted the researcher full access to all files involved in the Jan Kemp trial.
Included in these files were court transcripts, depositions, personal notes used during the
trial, notebooks that outline the evidence used in the trial, policy manuals from the
University of Georgia, a tape recording of a faculty meeting used as evidence, magazine
articles, and newspaper publications highlighting the trial. In addition, Henry agreed to
sit for an interview to discuss his experience with the Jan Kemp trial.
Secondary sources from scholarly works, NCAA reports, and other media sources
provided data that addressed the larger context surrounding the Jan Kemp case. An

10
analysis of these sources demonstrated that the evolution of the sport itself and the offthe-field academic scandals and controversy were woven throughout the history of
college football. The history of college football on and off the field forms the context in
which the issues from the Jan Kemp trial emerged at the University of Georgia.
The Intent of This Study
Although there are relentless, but fruitless efforts to reform college football, it appears
that at the University of Georgia, the greatest impetus to athletic reform came as a result
of the Jan Kemp trial.
John Thelin provides a thorough account of the off-the-field history of college
football that consisted of scandals and reform efforts that occurred as a result of a
continuous power play between revenue generating sports and academic integrity. Thelin
argues this point in the preface of his book, Games Colleges Play.
All too often significant reform effort has been illusory at worst and transient at
best, inflated by a foundation’s good intentions to seize the moment and to appear
to be making consequential progress. Meanwhile, chronic abuses persist. Most
troubling is that any attempt to instill strong academic standards and educational
values into highly commercialized sports teams runs the risk of antagonizing
those who like the established programs. 18
This study provides an in-depth look at the evolution of a controversial scandal
involving the intersection of revenue producing intercollegiate athletics and the academic
integrity of an institution, taking themes provided by past literature and studies of college
football reform and applying them to the themes that emerged at the University of
Georgia as a result of the Jan Kemp trial.
The Kemp trial uncovered academic abuses and preferential treatment of athletes
and students who were the children of certain politicians. During the trial, administrators
18

J. R. Thelin, "Games Colleges Play. Scandal and Reform in Intercollegiate Athletics," (1996).
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and the president of the University of Georgia defended their decisions to admit students
who were illiterate, but could play football. By taking a closer look at how the Kemp
trial unfolded, there is an opportunity to gain a more detailed understanding of how the
power and influence of college football affected the choices and decision making of
academic administrators and faculty members at the University of Georgia.

12

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This study looks closely at how the power and influence of college football
affected the decision making of administrators and faculty at the University of Georgia in
relation to the Jan Kemp affair. The literature review establishes the context surrounding
and building up to the events that impacted the Jan Kemp trial. First, the early history of
college football is discussed, with emphasis placed on early events that established the
influential role of college football. Second, early reform efforts in college football are
discussed, including its near abolition in 1905 and the first major study of college
athletics in the Carnegie Report of 1929. The third section begins with the 1940s and
leads into the growth of college football financially and in popularity during the years
following World War II. Finally, a brief history of college football at the University of
Georgia is discussed to provide a local context within the larger national history of
college football.
In 1869, Princeton University and Rutgers University engaged in what is
considered the first intercollegiate football game in the United States. The game they
played that day more resembled the game of soccer than the version of football played
today, but it is recognized by historians as the starting point for college football. The
soccer version of the game soon evolved into a game that resembled rugby. In 1873,
Yale, Princeton, Rutgers, and Columbia Universities held a meeting to establish formal

12
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rules for college football. At this time, football was primarily run by students and alumni
who stayed involved after graduation.
Beginning in 1880, football began to evolve into the version played today.
According to football historians, the transformation of football is due primarily to the
innovations of Walter Camp. Camp is known as the “Father of American Football.”
During his time as a student at Yale he began to push for changes to the game and when
he graduated, he became even more influential in changing the rules. Camp regularly
attended the athletic association meetings and helped to coach the Yale team. Camp was
well respected and even traveled to California to coach the Stanford University team. At
this time, there were no rules governing athletic eligibility so alumni and even faculty
members were often members of the football team. In 1878, Camp proposed changing
many of the old rules of the game. His proposals were rejected for a couple of years, but
he continued to propose the changes. In 1880, the rules convention for college football
agreed to lower the number of players for one team on the field from 15 to 11 which is
still the current rule for today. Additionally, they adopted Camp’s proposal for a
possession rule that allowed a team to retain possession of the ball without having to fight
for it each possession as was the case in rugby. This rule changed the face of American
football from hence forward. This one rule led to many further changes and the evolution
of the game of football played in the United States today. During the early 1880s, the
rules convention and Camp created a down and distance rule that relegated the number of
plays a team had to move the ball 5 or 10 yards. This rule then led to the idea to paint the
field with yard lines and create a grid on the field which led to the term “gridiron.” Camp

14
continued to work to change the rules on the field, but he also became instrumental in
changes off the field.19
As college football grew in popularity and began to create revenue, students no
longer ran the football programs. They focused on being players, and alumni like Walter
Camp ran the program. In a short time, Walter Camp successfully transformed a game
developed and run by students into what John Sayle Watterson described as a
“professional, systematic, businesslike enterprise.”20 Camp had dropped out of medical
school and went to work in business for a clock company. He learned about financial
management and business organization and brought these skills to his next transformation
of college football. At Yale, Camp controlled the funds as treasurer of the athletic
association and in 1899 he was hired officially to become the advisor on athletics. Camp
recognized that large amounts of money could be made on football and the students were
not experienced enough to manage the program and play. Camp became instrumental in
the promotion of college football as a commercial entity that did not have student
involvement as a priority of the activity. He continued to expand his vision and formed a
Graduate Advisors Committee that consisted of alumni from other institutions that played
college football. Walter Camp was turning college football into a business and showed
little concern for academics:
Neither Camp nor his colleagues had much sympathy for academic concerns,
especially faculty interests or complaints. In their view, students came to college
for four years of social and educational immersion, but for Camp and his friends,
the struggle for supremacy on athletic fields defined the college’s identity.21
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The popularity of college football was bringing attention to institutions, but not for
academic reasons. Campus leaders used the popularity and exposure of football to
promote themselves and their institution. (This practice is still seen today during
televised football games where the participating schools have several commercial
advertisements showcasing their institution). Football was a public relations vehicle for
college presidents and chancellors.22 Harvard, Yale, and Princeton had the funding to run
their programs without the need for much outside support. However, other institutions
had to look outside for financial assistance and “without fully realizing it, inexperienced
faculty and presidents were setting themselves up to be held hostage by alumni and
boosters.”23
Alumni and boosters became involved in the purchasing of supplies and
equipment in exchange for tickets. Colleges also made money by playing games on the
road in big cities. College football became a marketable product that was used by
universities to increase prestige. Colleges used the example set by Harvard, Yale, and
Princeton to create winning teams and huge spectacles that generated revenue. In many
cases, however, fielding a winning team meant they needed to recruit players whose only
role at the college was to participate in football. These players never went to classes and
eventually left the college after their playing time was finished.24 The desire to win
games, increase revenue, and promote the college created the unique bond between
college football programs and the institutions that supported them. According to
Frederick Rudolph, “Once the game enlisted the support of alumni and administration,
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there was no stopping its growth. For, once the sport had been accepted, the games had
to be won. Americans lacked a psychology for failure.”25
As football grew under the new rules developed by Walter Camp, the game also
became more violent. According to Watterson, faculty members at some colleges
became concerned about the effect the game was having on students.26 Recognizing the
conflict, Harvard’s president from 1869-1909, Charles Eliot, became the biggest
opponent of college football. Eliot and the faculty at Harvard between 1884 and 1906
continually tried to abolish football at Harvard. The faculty considered the game too
violent and a distraction from the intellectual pursuits it considered the focus of a college
education. Since the athletics committee at Harvard was made up primarily of faculty,
they did succeed in suspending football on occasion. However, extreme pressure from
students and alumni ultimately prevailed. Harvard’s inability to gain control over
football was directly related to Yale and Princeton’s unwillingness to reform football.
For example, in 1885 the Harvard faculty athletic committee was able to convince the
faculty to suspend football for a year. However, Yale and Princeton were unwilling to go
along with Harvard. Since that meant Yale and Princeton would get to play for the
championship, Harvard students and alumni began to pressure the committee. Yielding
to the pressure, the faculty at Harvard reconsidered and football was reinstated.27 Eliot
was never able to totally ban football from Harvard, but he did go on a crusade to reform
the sport. He proposed changes such as not allowing freshmen to participate and having
football played in alternating years or seasons so students could recover physically and
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devote time to studies. However, the concerns of academicians such as Eliot fell upon
deaf ears as revenue streams grew and the popularity of the sport increased.
According to both Watterson and Rudolph, the power of football to draw attention
to colleges, the involvement of alumni and boosters to pay for the program, and the desire
to field a winning team created a situation where schools placed a premium on their
athletic program in spite of any possible effects on the academic integrity of the college.28
As college football continued to grow and spread to more institutions, it became a greater
draw for players and fans. Football players were considered among the elite members of
the college community; conversations on campus were about the star athletes and not the
most recent lectures from faculty members. According to Frederick Rudolph, “the game
became so widely adopted that for the first time since the founding of Harvard College in
1636, colleges began to recognize the existence of intercollegiate relations.”29 Whether it
was considered a distraction or not, college football became a recruiting tool to increase
enrollment and a powerful public relations tool for the administration. Despite its
popularity, in the first thirty years after the first game in 1869, college football became
embroiled in controversy. Supporters viewed football as a way to develop character and
build strength. Opponents saw the game as a brutal distraction that had become too
commercialized and professional. The desire to have a winning team led to unethical
practices to gain an edge and expectations of preferential treatment for star athletes:
One college football player so learned the price of his usefulness that without fear
of failure he presented his laundry bill to the team manager just before game time
with the words: “I cannot pay it. You pay it or I do not play.”30
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In 1905, there were 18 deaths and 149 serious injuries related to football.31 These
staggering data caught the attention of not only college presidents, but also the President
of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt was an athlete himself and did not
want to see football simply abolished. Roosevelt intervened at that time and met with
administrators at Harvard, Princeton, and Yale. Roosevelt’s message was clear, ‘Reform
the game or it will be outlawed, perhaps even by an Executive Order of the President
himself.’32
At its point of potential demise, football became a central issue for the country. A
meeting of the country’s most prestigious academic institutions and the highest office in
the land became the collaboration needed to save college football. From this meeting,
changes were made and schools worked towards reform on the field. In December of
1905, Henry McCracken organized a conference that took reform to the next level. As
president of New York University, McCracken was concerned about the injuries and
deaths that occurred as a result of football. He made a plea to Harvard University
President Charles Eliot to lead an effort to discuss reforming the playing rules of football.
Eliot told MacCracken that he was not interested in reform, but only interested in
abolition of football. The reason Eliot gave to MacCracken for not participating in
simple reform was that “deaths and injuries are not the strongest argument against
football, that cheating and brutality are profitable is the main evil.”33 Despite Eliot’s
unwillingness to participate, MacCracken pulled together a conference that involved
institutions other than Harvard, Princeton, and Yale.
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At the time, these three institutions were called the Big Three because they
dominated the football landscape in the country and had formed their own association
called the Intercollegiate Football Association (IFA). This point is important because
these three schools were the most prominent in the academic and athletic realm at the
time. Additionally, they were the greatest revenue generators of all the institutions
participating in football, so other institutions rarely made decisions that challenged these
three institutions. According to Thelin, these three institutions were “most eligible to be
leaders” in college football reform.34 MacCracken brought together many of the
institutions that played football and together they decided to make real reforms to the
game. At a meeting on March 31, 1906, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States (IAAUS) was born. The IAAUS persisted and eventually became the
NCAA in 1910. The organization spent the next few years working on reforming
football on the field by creating new rules and systems that controlled the game.
However, it turned to individual institutions and organizations such as the Carnegie
Foundation to study and report on off the field issues such as academic integrity.
As the NCAA’s influence grew, so did the number of sports that conformed their
rules to those put together by the NCAA. By the end of World War I, the NCAA had 170
institutional members and responsibility for 11 men’s sports.35 As football’s popularity
grew, so did the preferential treatment, subsidizing of athletes, and violations of
amateurism. Football became a greater priority than the pursuit of academic endeavors
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and academic leaders became tired of the conflict.36 The NCAA left these issues for the
institutions to handle and it focused more on issues on the field since that was the original
charge given to the IAAUS by President Roosevelt in 1905. However, it did make
continued requests to the Carnegie Foundation to do a study of intercollegiate athletics.
Under the influence of Henry Pritchett, president of the Foundation, the Carnegie
Foundation eventually began a study of intercollegiate athletics.
Pritchett’s work at the Foundation had led to other major studies such as the
Abraham Flexner report of 1910 that studied medical schools and became a model for
future research done by the foundation.37 Pritchett understood that football attracted
students to the college. However, Pritchett felt football was a distraction from the
academic purpose of higher education. He even went as far as to make a list of perceived
evils in college athletics:








The paid coach;
Gate receipts;
Training tables (meals);
Special railroad cars;
Demoralizing publicity;
The unconscionable amount of time devoted to training;
The diluting of standards.38

In May of 1923, Pritchett proposed to the Foundation’s board that it support a study of
college athletics. After Abraham Flexner’s study of medical education, the foundation
had supported studies of legal education, engineering schools, and public school
education. The board did not show much interest in a study of athletics, although it
funded a small study done by the Southern Association for the study of college sports in
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the South. After this study was awarded a small grant, other critics and reformers began
to submit proposals. Eventually in 1925, the foundation allowed Howard Savage to do a
study of athletics in England. After looking at Savage’s attention to detail in that report
and after receiving a request from the NCAA to conduct a larger study of schools in the
United States, it approved a study of college athletics by Savage to begin in 1926.
Savage created a team of investigators that visited individual schools and conducted a
number of interviews at colleges around the United States. Savage’s report looked at
college athletics including intramurals, training, and public relations. The study looked
overall at all athletics, but a focus on football continued to emerge as Savage’s research
team investigated athletics at each college. In particular, the section of the report
dedicated to recruitment and subsidizing of athletes gained the most notoriety and
controversy. Of the 130 institutions studied by Savage’s team, very few received high
marks for not subsidizing athletes or engaging in unethical recruitment practices.
According to Watterson, the report primarily documented issues related to football and
was the first study “that documented the various forms of largely surreptitious actions
involved in supporting athletes.”39 Many of the activities cited in the report dealt with
loans from boosters, on-campus and off-campus employment that resulted in very little
work being done by the athlete, and the awarding of scholarships to athletes for nonathletic purposes such as leadership. The report also found instances of athletic
departments using special tutors to help keep athletes eligible.
The Carnegie Report was released in late October of 1929. Though the report
competed in the media with the stock market crash, it received much attention.
Newspapers ran stories about the report and college presidents began the task of
39

Ibid., p. 166.

22
defending their institutions. A common phrase uttered by presidents was, “If cheating
took place, I did not know it in my official capacity.”40 Coaches and athletic directors
showed disdain for the report and questioned the validity of the study.
The report did not look to the NCAA or the faculty to address these issues.
Savage looked to college presidents as the cause of the problem. According to Savage,
‘such are the position and the powers of the American College president, that once
having informed himself of the facts, and if he had moral fortitude, he would eliminate
the problem.’41 The Carnegie Report was the first comprehensive study of college
athletics. The major themes uncovered in the Carnegie Report were lack of presidential
control over athletics, the commercialization of athletics, the limited role of the faculty in
athletics, and the continued corruption of athletics as seen through preferential treatment
and unethical recruiting practices.
While the Carnegie Report was the greatest reform canon of the 1920s, it was the
events at the University of Chicago in the 1930s that offered a rare example of
presidential control over athletics. When Robert Hutchins became president at the
University of Chicago in 1929 he and faculty members at Chicago began the task of
transforming the academic experience of undergraduates. According to Watterson, “in
much the same way that Harvard had revolutionized its curriculum with Eliot’s elective
system, the University of Chicago abolished required courses for freshmen and
sophomores and made class attendance voluntary.”42 Students at Chicago now had to
follow a curriculum that led to a qualifying examination. The increased rigor of
academics at Chicago discouraged many athletes from playing football. To coincide with
40
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the academic changes, Chicago’s long time football coach and athletic director, Amos
Alonzo Stagg, was required to resign due to his age. Hutchins then hired a new athletic
director, T. Nelson Metcalf. Metcalf did not share the same love for big-time football
that had been a part of Chicago’s history up to this point. Between 1935 and 1939, the
University of Chicago football team endured losing seasons and embarrassing losses to
traditional rivals like Michigan, Harvard, and Illinois. By 1939, Hutchins had convinced
some trustees that Chicago should abolish football to protect its players from harm and to
not embarrass the school any further. He was able to convince people that despite a
terrible football team for over a decade, Chicago’s fundraising had not dropped and by
moving forward with abolition, Chicago would make a statement about the role of
athletics at Chicago.43 Hutchins serves as a rare example of a college president becoming
extremely involved in challenging the role of football at a university. Unlike other
reform efforts and other college presidents, Hutchins was not concerned with reforming
athletics beyond Chicago. He focused his attention on how football and academics were
related at Chicago and made decisions according to their specific situation.
Shortly after the University of Chicago abolished football in 1939, the NCAA,
under the leadership of William B. Owen from Stanford, sought to define the amateur
athlete and began to define the role of athletics in the academic realm. In its bylaws, the
organization began the process of establishing itself as a governing body to include
enforcement of rules set forth by the association. The organization had never seen itself
as an enforcer of rules since its inception in 1906. The NCAA had followed a tradition of
Home Rule. The Home Rule doctrine meant that each institution that was a member of
the NCAA had autonomy over its athletic program including salaries, eligibility, ticket
43
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sales, and building facilities. The NCAA viewed itself as an organization that made
recommendations, but did not enforce rules.44 As the revenue generating power of
intercollegiate athletics grew, there became a need for some way of addressing the
ongoing ethical misconduct of institutions that came as a result of increased focus on
increasing revenue. The power of college football had created a double standard on
college campuses where athletes were showered with gifts and given special treatment
behind the scenes, while the public image portrayed them as students first and athletes
second. The NCAA moved closer to becoming the enforcer of policies. However, as
Watterson claims, “only by taming football, the sport that produced gate receipts and
glory, could the NCAA return to the ideal of the amateur sportsman.”45 The NCAA
began to investigate violations of regulations and in 1948 put together the Principles for
Conduct in intercollegiate athletics. The code was meant to be a way of helping place
athletics in its proper place at colleges and universities. The following are the Principles
for the Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics as stated in the Article III of the NCAA
constitution of 1948:
•
•
•
•
•

44

Adherence to the definition of amateurism
The control and responsibility for the conduct of both intercollegiate and
intramural athletics shall, in the last analysis, be exercised by the
institution itself
Holding student-athletes to the same sound academic standards as the
student body
Awarding financial aid without consideration for athletic ability
A policy of recruiting that basically prohibited a coach or anyone
representing a member school from recruiting a prospective studentathlete with the offer of financial aid or equivalent inducement46
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The code also included a committee that looked at maintaining compliance and bringing
institutions up on charges for violating the code and regulations of the NCAA. One
drawback was that the NCAA did not have a very good way of enforcing the rules. Its
only real sanction was expulsion from the association and that required a two-thirds
majority vote of the members. Within two years of its adoption, the Sanity Code was
considered inoperable and the NCAA returned to the doctrine of Home Rule. However,
televising of college football convinced the NCAA to once again abandon the doctrine of
Home Rule.
In 1947, a TV station in Chicago began to regularly televise Notre Dame football
games. The University of Pennsylvania (Penn) had started televising its games in 1940.
By 1950, major television networks were paying Notre Dame and Penn more than
$75,000 annually for the rights to televise their football games. Notre Dame and Penn
continued to pursue more revenue through television contracts. This sentiment was in
sharp contrast to the NCAA’s view that the telecasting of games should be limited.47 The
NCAA felt that televising games hurt ticket revenue at live games. However, since the
NCAA practiced the doctrine of Home Rule, it did not regulate television contracts and
the individual institutions’ interest in negotiating for commercial television revenue. In
1950, Father Theodore Hesburgh addressed the NCAA convention and explained that
television was not hurting ticket revenue at Notre Dame and that they were hiring a
consultant to look at ways to promote Notre Dame through televising football games. In
the same year, Notre Dame negotiated a network television contract worth $185,000.
Notre Dame’s ability to gain that much revenue from television caught the attention of
the NCAA. In turn, the NCAA formed a television committee and by 1951 had taken
47
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away Notre Dame’s financial advantage from television by starting an experimental
television package that was negotiated by the NCAA.48 Though the NCAA stated that
the decision to get involved in televising games was not about money for the NCAA,
Ronald Smith makes a different observation: “Yet, even though money was not an
uppermost consideration, evidently no thought was given to telecasting on the
educational TV what was beginning to be introduced across the nation.”49 The NCAA’s
decision to pursue revenue generating television contracts instead of utilizing non-profit
educational television is evidence that money and commercialism did matter in its
decision making. The NCAA’s role in the televising of football games became the
catalyst for its new role as an enforcement agency. To address the enforcement of rules
the NCAA officially adopted a 12-point code and a method of enforcing the rules in 1952.
The Committee on Infractions was formed and established in 1954 and a full-time
position was created to help administer the process. The NCAA now had a way to
address some of the problems that were going on with the increased commercialization of
intercollegiate athletics.
The structure and influence of the NCAA continued to grow over the next couple
of decades. Increased opportunities for revenue from television contracts made
successful football programs a high priority for many institutions. With the growing
influence of television, the shift of power in the NCAA began to lean towards athletic
directors and presidents while faculty members saw their role diminish within the power
structure of the NCAA, even though, faculty members served in key positions within the
NCAA. In fact, except for 1959-60 and 1965-66, all the presidents of the NCAA were
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faculty members. The involvement of faculty members was intended to keep a strong
connection between academics and athletics. However, it appears that despite their
prominent positions in the NCAA, faculty members have historically had limited
influence on sports except when they participated in them.
As demonstrated earlier, faculty members at Harvard and other institutions tried
to suspend or abolish football in the early 1900s. At times, they had success, but in all
cases, the pressure from students, alumni, and boosters always led to the reinstatement of
football. Throughout the history of college football, its governing boards included
faculty members and in some cases started out run by the faculty. However, in most
cases, the make up of these boards was changed to include alumni and administrators.
Watterson states, “In the 1880s and early 1890s it was common for schools to have
faculty athletic committees, but gradually many of those committees were enlarged or
restructured to included alumni and students.”50
Attempts to give the faculty more control over the governance of athletics
happened throughout the history of college football. Almost 100 years before the Jan
Kemp trial, faculty members from seven institutions that were part of the Ivy League held
a conference called the Brown Conference to address reform and to reinstate faculty
control over athletics. They drafted a reform proposal for the Board of Directors at their
institutions. The proposal included the creation of committees dominated by faculty
members. These committees would oversee the operations and policies regarding
athletics. After several drafts, the members of the Brown Conference submitted their
proposals to the Board of Directors of the institutions they represented. None of the
institutions approved the changes. Watterson argued that even if the changes were made,
50
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they would have been difficult to enforce. Additionally, the lack of participation by
Walter Camp and was a primary reason for the proposal failing. According to Watterson,
the Board of Directors of the institutions did not trust faculty control over athletics.51
What little role in athletics that the faculty attained in the early 1900s diminished
completely by the 1980s. After William Flynn, an athletic director, was elected president
of the NCAA in 1978, only one more faculty member became president of the association
(1989-90).52
The 1980s became a time of increased involvement by institutional presidents in
the NCAA. Alan Chapman, a faculty member at Rice University and former president of
the NCAA, stated,
“Up until that time, presidents more or less had the attitude of keep things
running smoothly and don’t bother me, but then it became more and more
apparent that CEOs had to be more involved because in the end it was they
who were on the firing line, particularly when infractions started attracting
so much prominence from media.”53
As money increasingly played a part in the evaluation of success and failure in college
sports, the number of NCAA regulations violations also increased.
According to Watterson, the events at Southern Methodist University (SMU) in
the 1980s created the biggest scandal among many during that decade.54
The founders of SMU used football as a way to keep supporters happy and attract
attention to the school. The school was founded in 1911 and by 1922 it was temporarily
suspended by the Southwest Conference and nearly expelled for illegally subsidizing
their education. According to Watterson, the conference held a vote to determine if SMU

51

Watterson, College Football, p. 52-53.
Hawes, K. "History of the Ncaa: The Ncaa Century Series." The NCAA News (1999).
53
Alan Chapman as quoted in Brown, “Passing the Grade,” The NCAA News, p. 2.
54
Watterson, College Football, p. 353.
52

29
should be expelled and the university was saved by one vote cast by its own
representative. Among the violations were secret loans, student activity scholarships,
free books, and being paid for jobs that did not require work.55 SMU one the conference
title the next year. In the 1940s, SMU football was extremely successful and the
university gained notoriety for its football teams and for its star players. From 1951 to
1976, SMU did not fare as well athletically; by the 1960s the Dallas Cowboys, a
professional football team, became competition for SMU in terms of revenue generation.
In 1973, after a change in presidents, the university reported itself to the Southwest
Conference concerning violations in which players were paid to play. SMU received a
one-year probation. The NCAA did an additional investigation and blacked out
televising of SMU games and did not allow the University to participate in postseason
bowl games. Following its probation, SMU continued to pay players and entice top
recruits to join SMU in exchange for cars and money. The NCAA investigated again in
the 1980s and following the investigation, SMU was charged with 80 allegations. SMU
had a history of major infractions in 1958, 1964, 1974, 1975, and 1981. Despite the
repeated penalties and probations at SMU, the University continued to violate rules and
put athletics ahead of academics
SMU received the NCAA death penalty in 1987 as a result of its improprieties.
The NCAA death penalty for SMU meant that the institution could no longer field a
football team. Watterson stated that “as long as an athletic culture held sway at an
institution, the president acting alone would find it almost impossible to uproot.”56
Watterson claimed that the eventual demise of SMU’s football program led to the
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creation of the Knight Commission,57 arguing that incidents like those at SMU led to
reform efforts in college football. However, “colleges and college presidents had not
come to grips with the gridiron creed of bigger is better, a mind-set that had almost from
the beginning of college football led to flagrant abuses and periodic upheavals.”58 The
increased involvement of administrators in the decision making kept the faculty members
from being involved in the governance of athletics at universities.
Faculty representatives were relegated to dealing with student-athlete welfare
issues and not with major decision making on issues that were not necessarily academic
in nature. Vocal faculty members argued for the involvement of the faculty in athletic
decision making. Percy Bates, the faculty representative at the University of Michigan in
1999, discussed the importance of faculty members in athletics when he was interviewed
about subject for an article for The NCAA News. Bates said,
“It’s nice to have a perspective from someone there whose job doesn’t depend on
the athletic success of the team. That’s one of the things the faculty reps were
insulated by- their jobs depended on their academic endeavors and they could
provide the viewpoint that the professionals couldn’t, as well as CEOs, who were
more concerned with public image and so forth.”59
Despite the arguments for more significant inclusion of the faculty in the governance of
athletics, the power shifted to administrators, presidents, and benefactors. The changes in
the political structure of the NCAA coincided with a decade of scandals and issues
brought on by the commercialization of college athletics. As money became the
dominant issue in the NCAA, the leadership reflected people more closely tied to the
revenue streams. Toward the end of the 1980s, reform and control of intercollegiate
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athletics became a theme among leaders in higher education. James Duderstadt, former
president of the University of Michigan, stated,
it is time for universities to reassert control over intercollegiate athletics and
to realign them with the academic priorities of higher education. Key in this
effort will be the difficult but essential task of resisting the pressure-whether from
the media or politicians, trustees or alumni, fans or the public at large, or even
some of our coaches, athletic directors, and university presidents- to transform
college sports into an entertainment industry.60
As a result of the scandals in the 1980s, the trustees of the John S. and James L.
Knight Foundation created a commission on intercollegiate athletics in 1989. The
trustees were concerned that the abuses in college athletics posed a threat to the integrity
of higher education. (The Jan Kemp trial was one of the scandals referred to by the
Knight Foundation) The commission’s interest was to place the role of intercollegiate
athletics in its proper perspective. Its definition of the proper perspective was as a
spectator sport that fans could enjoy but also did not engage in behaviors that threatened
the academic integrity of higher education. The Knight Commission’s focus was on bigtime athletics programs. The commission defined big-time athletics programs as those
“institutions fighting for the big bucks that television exposure and bowl games and
NCAA tournaments brought.”61 Data provided by surveys conducted for the Knight
Foundation by various research groups provided evidence to justify the need for major
reform in intercollegiate athletics. Some highlights of the data are as follows:
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Nearly a third of present and former professional football players responding
to a survey said they accepted illicit payments while in college and more than
half said they saw nothing wrong with the practice;
Another survey showed that among the 100 big-time schools, 35 had
graduation rates under 20 percent for their basketball players and 14 had the
same low rate for their football players.62

The Knight Commission referenced the work of the Carnegie Report of 1929 and
acknowledged that the situation had become worse over the 60 years between the two
reform efforts because of the millions of dollars television poured into college athletics.
The commission viewed its challenge as winning support for realistic reform efforts that
would bring all institutions together.
The commission proposed a model or guideline for reform, the one-plus-three
model. In this model, the one is presidential control. The idea is that the president
should have ultimate authority over athletics and should direct control toward academic
integrity, financial integrity, and independent certification. Like the Carnegie Report of
1929, the Knight Commission viewed the key player in reform as the institutional
president. Also, like the Carnegie Report of 1929, the commission did not seek to
address individual problems on specific campuses. The commission made no claims that
its recommendations would solve all the problems in intercollegiate athletics. The cochair for the Knight Commission was President Emeritus of the University of Notre
Dame, Theodore Hesburgh. In creating the commission, the foundation acknowledged
that the millions of dollars from television contracts was a key factor in creating problems
in intercollegiate athletics. In contrast, Hesburgh was the driving force behind Notre
Dame negotiating individually for its own television contract and calling any efforts to
share revenue during television negotiations in the 1950s as socialistic. In response to
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Hesburgh’s views in the 1950s, Ronald A. Smith wrote, “Hesburgh was Robin Hood’s
antithesis, for he was trying, unsuccessfully, to create a Super Conference to put control
of television money solely in the hands of the big-time power schools.”63 The irony of
the Knight Commission was that Hesburgh was a proponent of big-time athletic prowess
and was now leading a commission that was seeking to attack the power and control he
had achieved during his time as president.
Critics of the Knight Commission believed that the initial intent of the
commission was good, but in the end it succumbed to the revenue-generating power of
college athletics and the NCAA. For example, The Drake Group served as a major critic
of the Knight Commission. The Drake Group was formed in 1999 to look at radical
reforms to intercollegiate athletics. The group published essays and statements that
pushed their reform agenda. Unlike the Knight Commission’s focus on television
revenue, The Drake Group believed that the only way to reform athletics was through
disclosing of academic records so institutions could not hide academic deficiencies
among athletes.64 Like the Carnegie Report of 1929, following the Knight Commission’s
reports, institutions made some changes and took a closer look at policies. Graduation
rates increased somewhat, but not to a level to state that major reform had taken place. In
2007, USA Today reshuffled the ranking of the top 25 teams in college football by
graduation rates. The Division I-A average at the time was 66% for college football
players with schools such as Boston College and Michigan rated in the top ten. The
University of Georgia was ranked 25th with a graduation rate of 41%.65 The effectiveness
of the Knight Commission’s reform efforts is debatable. Like its predecessors in reform,
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it focused on the presidential control and not on commercialization as a reform
component.
The Knight Commission is now working in collaboration with the NCAA and
never became involved in the issues around revenue generation. It is the power of the
market and many of the external influences James Duderstadt referred to in his book,
Intercollegiate Athletics and the American University: A University President's
Perspective that effected change in the relationship between academic priorities and
athletic priorities. J. Douglas Toma, however, viewed the relationship between athletics
and the college differently. According to Toma, college football is ingrained in the
culture of a university. He refers to institutions with major revenue-producing football
programs as Football U.66 Toma argued that “spectator sports are central in institutional
life, providing the campus with a distinctive identity and popular appeal.”67 According to
Toma, universities with big-time football choose between separating out athletics or
taking advantage of their program. In other words, athletics is used as a source of
community and as a centerpiece for the campus culture or it is isolated and deemphasized.
He argued that universities overwhelmingly choose to embrace and use athletics to
promote the university. According to Toma, embracing athletics has become mandatory
because to ignore athletics puts the university at risk of lacking control over athletics.
Lack of control can lead to violations and sanctions in relation to NCAA policies.
According to Toma, “the trade-off for institutions for sports-enhanced external support,
political and otherwise, is often diminished institutional control over intercollegiate
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athletics.”68 Rick Telander argued that universities created the spectacle of college
football and the corrupt activities are a part of maintaining a big-time college football
program. Telander used the University of Nebraska as an example of this financial
spectacle by stating, “it has produced a football team, as other universities have, that
carries so much emotional freight for so many people that it has become an awesome
economic force.”69
The University of Georgia (UGA) is a model for the type of football program
described by Telander, Toma, and Duderstadt. Nearly 115 years ago, the University of
Georgia (UGA) played its first college football game against Mercer College on Herty
Field. Herty Field is located on north campus in the original academic quadrangle of the
University of Georgia campus. The university then organized a game with Auburn
University in Atlanta, Georgia. The game between Georgia and Auburn became known
as the “South’s oldest collegiate rivalry.”70 College football at the University of Georgia
has grown in popularity, size, tradition, and influence. How important is college football
to the University of Georgia? Former head football coach and athletic director at the
University of Georgia, Vince Dooley wrote, “Athletics is one of the things we do in the
name of the University of Georgia. It’s the way we fly our colors. It’s one of the
primary reasons UGA people say, I bleed Red and Black!”71
Football began to be used as a mechanism for increasing the university’s national
exposure in the 1920s. By playing games against national powerhouse programs like
Harvard, Yale, and Chicago, UGA attempted to bring attention to the institution for non68
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football reasons. In 1929, the same year as the Carnegie Report, the University of
Georgia established an independent Georgia Athletic Association. According to Thomas
Dyer, the University of Georgia athletic association “in many ways took authority over
intercollegiate athletics out from under the umbrella of the university administration and
the renewal of the charter for the association in 1949 confirmed that extra-institutional
forces would for another twenty years shape the development of intercollegiate
athletics.”72
When the first football game at the university was played there were maybe 100
spectators in attendance. Today, football is played in Sanford Stadium which hosts a
capacity crowd of over 92,000 people. The evolution of football at the University of
Georgia included a focus on popular exposure and revenue generation. Boosters and
alumni have driven revenues to new levels as highlighted in Richard Ernsberger’s book,
Bragging Rights: A Season Inside the SEC. He notes that revenues from college football
have become so important that practically every school in the Southeastern Conference
has recently expanded its stadium and added scores of luxury boxes for wealthy
boosters.73 John Thelin’s analysis of the University of Georgia as a booster campus
presents the dilemma past presidents faced when the needs of the college football
program came into conflict with the academic mission and financial stability of the
institution.74 In his analysis, Thelin also relies on Thomas Dyer’s research on the
University of Georgia as evidence of the evolution of these dilemmas.
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According to Dyer, the growth and prominence of college football at UGA
stemmed from the overall changes the University experienced at the turn of the 20th
century. In 1898, Walter Barnard Hill was named Chancellor of the University of
Georgia and he brought with him an agenda which included transforming the University
into a more utilitarian institution that served society. In a speech in 1905, Hill stated that
the University “will connect its activities more closely with the business and life of the
people.”75 Following Hill’s tenure, President David C. Barrow continued the
modernization effort at the University. According to Dyer, intercollegiate athletic
competition became “an additional source of stress inevitably accompanying expansion
and modernization.”76 Football served as a public relations tool and once it survived the
on the field reform to curb the violence in the early 1900s, its popularity grew and began
to contribute to the University’s public persona. Dyer continues,
With the popularization of football, however, and the accompanying improvement
in modes of communication, the exploits of athletes became available to
thousands who totally lacked connections with any college, but followed
collegiate teams with a fervor which matched that of the alumni.77
John Thelin included UGA in his analysis of the populist booster campus circa 19291946. The populist booster campuses saw institutional growth as an extension of the
aspirations of the state government. According to Thelin, this was decidedly so in the
Western and Southern regions of the United States. In his analysis of four universities,
one of them being UGA, he stated that “these cases created the models of funding,
coaching, and recruiting that characterized big-time college sports after 1930.”78 Thelin’s
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analysis offered one important perspective of the role of college football at the University
of Georgia.
The newly established prominence of intercollegiate athletics presented a number
of conflicts between the academic integrity of the institution and the desire for athletic
prowess. Dyer cites one example where the University of Georgia Athletic Association
realized that prospective athletes who were unable to attain regular admission into the
University in the College of Arts and Sciences could gain admission into the Law School
because it had little or no admissions requirements.79 In his research, Dyer cites similar
conflicts and in each case the president or administrators involved deferred to the desires
of the athletic association because they needed the support of key alumni and the
exposure of athletics to help increase academic offerings.
The creation of the University of Georgia Athletic Association is an important
event in the evolution of athletics at the university. Additionally, it is important to this
study because it established the significance of college football at the university. Since
the Athletic Association was a private entity, it was free to make decisions concerning
athletics outside the university’s umbrella of control. The Athletic Association board
primarily consisted of influential alumni and though some faculty members were on the
board, the private status of the association diminished their involvement. The athletic
association also served as an external form of pressure on the athletic department that was
in conflict with the academic mission of the university. For example, during World War
II, the dilemma arose for then President Harmon Caldwell to decide whether or not
football should be played during wartime. The institution, with the support of the board,
continued to play football even to the tune of a significant financial deficit. The deficit
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forced Caldwell to contact prominent alumni to give money to make up for the deficit. In
addition, to subsidize the funding of the football program during wartime, Caldwell
agreed to turn over student activity fees to the athletic association board to make up for
lost revenue and increased expenses.80
The arrival of President Omer Aderhold in 1951 signaled a commitment to
becoming a modern university with a focus on research.81 According to Dyer, these
competing forces played a significant role in creating the university culture and
environment for the decades that followed his presidency. With the transition into Fred
Davison’s presidency in 1967, the focus on research and prestige continued to create the
institutional context surrounding the Jan Kemp trial.
During the timeframe leading up to the Jan Kemp trial, faculty members were
involved in disputes with President Davison. In the 1970s, faculty became the protesters
because during the time period of 1971-1973, Davison created what Jan Kemp’s lawyer,
Hue Henry, described as a climate of fear.82 Davison was meeting opposition from all
the ranks, but he also used tremendous pressure to snuff out any opposition. Alan Siegel,
a UGA student, described UGA under Davison as an oppressive climate in his
valedictorian speech. Siegel’s speech became an attack on Davison and his
administration. Siegel addressed Davison during his speech, stating that the President
was “exerting pressure in an effort to muzzle diverse opinions.”83
During Davison’s tenure 14 deans and department heads resigned from their
position. The rebellions and resignations were the result of a long struggle between the
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faculty and the administration over Davison’s new promotion and tenure standards. In
1971, in his State of the University Address, Davison stated that in order to manage the
budget better and to be more pragmatic, he was instituting new promotion and tenure
standards. Davison drew fire from the faculty because the new standards deemphasized
teaching and emphasized research. The faculty detested Davison’s impersonal approach
and unwillingness to involve faculty in changes. The tension continued and became such
a powder keg that then Governor Jimmy Carter had to step in and urge the administration
and the faculty to work out their differences.84 Davison continued to tout the university’s
increased research dollars and enrollment as the shining points of the university and his
administration. To Davison’s credit, the university experienced exponential growth
during his tenure of nearly two decades. However, his push for growth in scientific
research and desire for prestige came at the expense of his relationship with the faculty.
On the inside, faculty morale was at a low point. A statement in the Athens Observer
indicative of the time came from an English professor, Marion Montgomery. He stated in
response to Davison’s boasts of enrollment and expansion,
by such an argument for quality, we may consider that our problems with
inflation and depression are rapidly solved by our welfare statistics. More money
is spent each year on welfare, and more names are added to the welfare roll, so
therefore we are rapidly expanding and progressing, to use two of President
Davison's favorite words. . . better teachers and better students proved by the fact
of better grades. Nonsense.85
In 1977, Virginia Trotter was named as Vice President for Academic Affairs. In
Davison fashion, she immediately told department heads and faculty to not talk poorly of
Davison or the institution in public. Trotter was part of what Athens lawyer Hue Henry
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dubbed the puppet cabinet.86 Based on his experiences suing the university, Henry
claimed that it was evident that many of the administrators at the university were not
hired to be free thinkers but to serve as messengers for President Davison. Jerrold
Footlick outlined these issues in his book Truth and Consequences: How Colleges and
Universities Meet Public Crises. In one chapter of Footlick’s book, he analyzed the
public relations issues that arose as a result of the Jan Kemp trial and how the university
managed them. His perception of the Davison administration was that “Davison and a
small coterie of advisors ran the university with little external input or opposition.”87 The
fallout from the Jan Kemp trial ultimately exposed problems that occurred during
Davison’s presidency.
Summary of the Literature
For as long as football has been a part of collegiate culture, controversy and
scandals have played a part in its history. Regardless of their position, university
administrators have struggled when faced with the seemingly competing interests of
college football and academic integrity.
Football began as an extracurricular activity primarily played by students. With
the influence of Walter Camp and administrators’ realization that football could generate
tremendous revenue, the sport quickly became a protected and defended component of
many colleges. Camp introduced new rules on the field and established ways to organize
and market the sport off the field. Presidents and campus leaders used football to gain
exposure for their institution. Due to the large expense of running a football program,
faculty members and presidents allowed alumni and boosters to become involved in
86
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supporting the programs financially. However, with the financial support came
expectations such as tickets for games and involvement in decisions.
Using the momentum of popular support, football thrived at colleges. Even the
violent nature of the sport and the many deaths it caused did not stop the sport from
continuing to grow. When faced with possible abolition by the President of the United
States, Theodore Roosevelt, college football made adjustments, but kept moving forward.
A significant result of this event was the formation of the IAAUS which eventually
became the NCAA. Football was now legitimately aligned with colleges and had the
official backing of a national organization to assist in the development of the sport.
The powerful influence of football over the masses meant that colleges placed it
at a high level of importance in culture and operation of the institution. In many cases,
this meant that the need to succeed in football superseded the academic mission of the
college and the integrity of its academic programs.
Henry Pritchett became concerned with the impact football had on higher
education. He used his influence to convince the Carnegie Foundation to conduct a study
of intercollegiate athletics was needed. In 1929, the Carnegie Foundation supported and
published a study entitled American College Athletics. The study was led and written by
Howard Savage. The study uncovered 4 major concerns within college athletics; lack of
presidential control, commercialization, limited role of the faculty, and corruption
through preferential treatment of athletes. How important was the Carnegie Report of
1929? John Thelin argues that “any substantive discussion about the reform of
intercollegiate athletics in American higher education starts and eventually returns to
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American College Athletics.88 The Carnegie Report established the core problems seen
when athletics and academic integrity come into conflict. This report served as the
foundation for future reform efforts. While the Carnegie Report established some of the
major issues, Robert Hutchins used his power as president to change the fate of football
as one of the country’s most prestigious academic and athletic institutions.
By increasing the expected academic rigor a student faced at the University of
Chicago, Hutchins successfully created an environment where students chose academics
over football. In order for them to succeed at the institution academically, they couldn’t
focus the needed energy on participating in football at the level expected by coaches.
Once the football team started losing games, it became easy for Hutchins to convince
trustees to abolish football. While this was a truly uncommon means of reforming
college athletics, it serves as an important example of how a university president can
have power and influence over the role of athletics at an institution.
Following the Carnegie Report and the abolishment of football at the University
of Chicago, the NCAA created rules to govern the role of athletics within the academic
mission. They created a code in 1948 to define the conduct of institutions, administrators,
and athletes. However, once the NCAA challenged its own core values of athletics, it
realized it had no real power to enforce rules or influence institutions to follow the rules.
It was not until football games became televised that the NCAA garnered an opportunity
to become an enforcement agency.
College football and the NCAA grew as the popularity of television grew. The
NCAA controlled television contracts. The amount of revenue involved in these
contracts was enormous for the time. Even when given the opportunity to use free public
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television to telecast games, the NCAA and universities never gave it consideration. The
potential revenue generating opportunities were too much to pass on. Money played a
significant role in the decision making of administrators concerning college athletics.
With the NCAA and universities involved in television contracts and tremendous revenue
streams, the role of the faculty in the governance of the NCAA and on athletic boards
diminished. A closer look at the history of college football shows that even though the
faculty was in a seemingly important position to effect change in the athletic realm, the
reality on their own campuses was that the people closest to the revenue streams for
athletics were still in control of athletics.
The focus on revenue and athletic prowess led to a decade of major scandals
involving universities like SMU and the University of Georgia. SMU started its football
program in order bring attention to the university. It used the program and pumped a lot
of money ethically and unethically into athletics. Eventually, SMU became the first
institution to receive the NCAA’s death penalty for sports programs and they have only
recently begun to play football again. The theme of commercialization and revenue
generation is found throughout the history of college football. The SMU case is
important because it happened along a similar timeline to the Jan Kemp trial. Also, the
decision of administrators at SMU is comparable to the issues that evolved during the Jan
Kemp trial.
As a result of scandals in the 1980s, the Knight Foundation formed a commission
1989 to address reform needs in college athletics. The commission tried to place athletics
in the proper perspective at colleges and universities. The commission established a oneplus-three model. The commission’s idea was that presidential control of athletics was
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key to successfully placing it within the academic context of an institution. The
commission’s work is the most recent major reform effort in the United States. What is
significant about the Knight Commission’s work is that the issues identified by the
commission are in essence the same issues identified by Howard Savage in 1929.
It appears that since Theodore Roosevelt nearly abolished football in 1905, a
major reform effort has taken place approximately every 20 years. The Carnegie Report
started the college football reform canon in 1929. In 1948, the NCAA attempted to
establish a code of conduct for colleges concerning the role of athletics, but failed
because it lacked the ability to enforce rules. In 1974, George Hanford’s report for the
American Council on Education argued for more involvement from the faculty in
governance of athletics and pointed out that many institutions were losing money form
athletics. Last, the Knight Commission published its reform model in 1989. Does this
mean a new major reform effort is about to form in 2009? The trend seems to point to
this possibility.
The decisions made concerning college football throughout history point to
commercialization of the sport as a major influence. Additionally, the desire to increase
the exposure of the school through the success of sports teams led administrators to
justify turning a blind eye to academic integrity issues for the sake of increasing athletic
prowess was justified. In studying the history of the University of Georgia, the decision
to play football during wartime and the establishment of the Athletic Association as a
private entity were both influenced by the external pressures from boosters and internal
pressures to increase revenue and enrollment. A study of the Jan Kemp case adds to the
history of college football and attempts to reform. It also establishes the decisions of
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administrators that led to the most recent reform efforts in college athletics. Additionally,
studying this case within the context of the history of college football may lend insight
into what issues to look for when the next major reform effort in college football comes
around because if history is a guide, then the next major challenge to college football is
coming.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The method of this study involves using an historical method that includes
document analysis and interviews. These procedures were used to gain knowledge of the
evolution of the problems that led to the Jan Kemp trial. The analysis of court documents,
multimedia publications, and additional primary sources from before, during, and after
the trial helped to describe the context of the situation during a ten year span that
included the trial and primarily Jan Kemp’s term of employment at the university. The
data was used to interpret how the decisions of administrators were affected by the
context. Additionally, interviews were conducted to offer personal insight from people
close to the situation. These interviews provided details that give extended depth to the
textual analysis of the trial. To collect the data necessary to study this case, the following
procedures were utilized:
1. A purposeful sample of people with unique knowledge to the Jan Kemp trial were
chosen for interviews;
2. An interview protocol and a list of questions were developed;
3. Interviews were scheduled and conducted;
4. An extensive amount of legal and personal documents belonging to J. Hue Henry
were collected and analyzed;
5. Primary sources from the University of Georgia archives were analyzed;
6. Secondary sources were analyzed in relation to their relevance to the trial.
Deciding on a Purposeful Sample of Documents and People
To understand the events in and surrounding the Jan Kemp trial, it was necessary
to use a purposeful sample of documents and people because of their unique connection
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to the situation. Merriam explains that “purposeful sampling is based on the assumption
that the investigator wants to discover, understand, and gain insight and therefore must
select a sample from which the most can be learned.” The first step in purposive
sampling is creating criteria to define the importance of the samples being chosen.89
For this study, a document or person had to provide unique information related to
events in or surrounding the Jan Kemp trial. In addition, information that specifically
addressed how the people involved made decisions related to the intersection of
academics and athletics were deemed valuable to the study. A meeting with Jan Kemp’s
attorney, J. Hue Henry, started the process of identifying documents and people with
unique access to and knowledge of the case. Following the meeting, Henry donated his
files and personal documents from the trial for use in this study. These documents
included court transcripts, depositions, evidence used during the trial, newspaper and
magazine clippings, audiotapes, and personal notes taken by the lawyers. In total the
files donated by Henry filled three 30-gallon plastic containers and three additional
banker’s boxes. These documents were the foundation of the study. A majority of the
information used to analyze the case came from these documents. After further analysis
of these documents, information emerged that led to seeking out additional samples of
data and evidence. The data from these documents also contributed to the creation of
interview questions used in this study and deciding on participants to interview.
After reviewing the files, I determined a number of people I wanted to interview
in order to gain additional insight into the trial. First, I saw my own perspective as a fan
and supporter of college football. I sought out the perspectives of Jan Kemp and Hue
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Henry to understand why they chose to challenge the system of college football at the
University of Georgia. Fred Davison and Virginia Trotter were both decease at the time
of this study so I relied on textual evidence to gain their perspective on the trial and the
relationship between college football and the University of Georgia. I then attempted to
make contact with Leroy Ervin, but was unsuccessful in finding him. He did conduct a
lecture at Georgia Perimeter College in 2006 and I used that lecture as some of the basis
to gain his perspective on the relationship between college football and the University of
Georgia. I also relied on his testimony in court transcripts and the transcripts of
interviews done with him following the trial. There was another administrator who
worked in Developmental Studies at that the time of the trial. I asked the person for an
interview and they declined. They spoke with me off the record about some issues and I
used that information to help me find additional resources and perspectives. The person
said the incident was a difficult time and did not wish to re-live it.
Interview Protocol and Questions
Interview questions were created and interviewees were identified for the
interview portion of the study, based on their unique perspective on the Jan Kemp trial
and the relationship between academics and football. The questions were intended to
gain the perspective of the interviewee in relation to the following criteria:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The participant’s views on intercollegiate athletics and college football;
The participant’s perceptions of college football at the University of Georgia;
The participant’s perceptions of the campus environment and the Jan Kemp affair;
The participant’s view of individuals at the University of Georgia who were
involved in the trial.
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The questions were reviewed by the dissertation advisor and the Georgia State
Institutional Review Board. After changes were made, the questions were ready to be
used in an interview setting.
Following the creation of the interview questions, the researcher developed an
interview protocol and began to contact interviewees. The pre-interview protocol
consisted of contacting the interviewees via the phone or email. Second, the researcher
explained the study and the purpose of the interview and what role the interviewee played
in the study. Third, confirmation of the participation from the interviewee was requested.
If the interviewee agreed to participate, a time, date, and location of the interview was
established. Finally, the researcher explained the confidentiality of the interview and that
the interviewee could choose not to participate or stop participation at any point in time.
All interviews were conducted in locations convenient to the interviewee. For example,
Jan Kemp was interviewed in her house and Hue Henry was interviewed in a restaurant
next to his law office.
The protocol for the actual interview consisted of following a set procedure as
well as allowing for an open dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee. The
interviews began with an explanation of the study and the researcher’s view on the
interviewee’s significance to the study. Then, following some discussion and
background information, the researcher began asking questions. A list of questions used
to guide the interviews is located in the Appendix A.
Analysis of Hue Henry’s Legal Files
A major component of this study involved analyzing court documents, legal briefs,
and documents found in the files of Hue Henry. Henry was Kemp’s attorney during the
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trial and donated his files for use in this study. Henry and the researcher are
acquaintances and this relationship allowed the researcher an opportunity to gain access
to Henry’s personal files. For example, the audio tape of a meeting that was secretly
recorded by a former faculty member in Developmental Studies was included in the files.
The transcripts of the meeting were used as evidence in the trial because the meeting
involved faculty members and key administrators in academic affairs and the athletic
department. In addition, the arguments in the case covered a number of issues directly
related to the intersection of academics and college football. There was a lot of text
dedicated to issues surrounding Kemp’s performance as a teacher, issues of tenure, and
Leroy Ervin’s tenure process. For the purposes of this study, I focused on evidence that
related to the intersection of college football and academic integrity. The researcher
analyzed documents with the intent of identifying information that gave insight into the
decision making of administrators and faculty members in relation to the athletic program
and Developmental Studies.
The first step in analyzing Henry’s legal files was organizing the files for use in
this study and determining the importance of information to the study. A document’s
importance to the study was gauged by its relation to the research questions discussed in
Chapter 1. As a reminder, these questions were:
1. How did the themes identified by the Carnegie Report in 1929 play a role in the
Jan Kemp affair and the relationship between academic integrity and athletics?
2. What internal and external factors created an environment for this scandal and
how did it affect the decision making of key administrators?
The first documents analyzed were the depositions of Jan Kemp and Leroy Ervin.
The initial questioning of these two key figures established arguments for both sides of
the case. In their depositions, Kemp and Ervin answered questions concerning their
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employment at the University of Georgia, their professional relationship, and their
perspectives on the reasoning for Kemp’s dismissal. Of particular importance were the
policies and actions that involved athletes. From these initial depositions, the lawyers
built their arguments for the trial and the same was done to build the arguments for this
study. After analyzing the depositions, the researcher turned to the opening statements
and the testimonies of Jan Kemp and Leroy Ervin. The combination of these documents
established three specific issues involving college football players and academic integrity.
The first was the role of Developmental Studies and its relationship to athletics at the
University of Georgia. Second, the admission and exiting of athletes at the University of
Georgia emerged as an important issue. Last, there were additional factors concerning
the preferential treatment of athletes. Once these three major themes were established,
the next step was to begin analyzing documents to look for evidence that answered the
research questions and why particular decisions were made.
The University of Georgia Archives
The University of Georgia has extensive archives related to the Jan Kemp trial
and other key individuals including presidential papers, newspaper articles, minutes from
committee meetings, and other important evidence. The archives at the University of
Georgia have dedicated a specific section to what the staff titled The Jan Kemp Affair.
Within this section were boxes containing mainly newspaper clippings and artifacts from
the trial. These documents provided internal and external perspectives on the trial and
the relationship between the university and college football. After explaining the study to
archivists at the University of Georgia, they identified additional volumes they believed
valuable to this research. Of particular importance to this study, were copies of the
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faculty newsletter, The Columns. The Columns was an important means of
communication during the time. The Columns highlighted the increased involvement of
the faculty following the Jan Kemp trial. When analyzing documents in the archives, the
same research questions were used to establish the importance of documents.
Analysis of Secondary Sources
The secondary sources analyzed in the case provided additional perspectives that
gave insight to the research questions established in this study. A significant amount of
research showed that historically college football has created controversy in relation to its
role at colleges and universities. The efforts throughout history to reform college football
are important to this study because they create a context for the decision making at the
University of Georgia concerning its athletes. Again, the research questions developed
for this study were used as a guideline to decide on the importance of secondary source
information. For instance, John Thelin discusses the creation of the University of
Georgia’s Athletic Association as a private entity in his book Games Colleges Play.
Thelin’s perspective on this event is important to the study of the Jan Kemp case because
he writes about it within a larger national and historical context.
As information emerged from the primary sources, answers to how and why
administrators made their decisions concerning athletes also emerged. In analyzing
secondary sources, I looked for comparable situations where administrators made
decisions for the same reasons.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE
Five key issues that directly involved the intersection of academics and athletics
evolved during the trial: the creation and purpose of the Developmental Studies program
along with its placement within the university structure; promotion and tenure in the
Developmental Studies program; the admission of athletes into the Developmental
Studies program and the university; the exiting of athletes from the Developmental
Studies program; and other preferential treatment given to athletes.
Additionally, analysis of the trial showed that race was a component that needs to
be studied more closely. The trial concerned the relationship between college football
and the Developmental Studies program. In most cases, the football players in
Developmental Studies were African-American. The Developmental Studies was also
created to help minority students with their transition to college.
Developmental Studies
Race was certainly a factor in the creation of the Developmental Studies program.
In 1973 the Board of Regents for the state of Georgia approved an initiative that created
developmental studies programs at all institutions within the University System of
Georgia as part of the state’s desegregation plan. In addition, this initiative was aimed at
increasing the enrollment and graduation of minority students in college. Between 1960
and 1972, the state had seen a tremendous amount of growth in the number of students
attending college. As more students came to college, it appeared that many of these
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students were lacking skills in the areas of mathematics, reading, and English to prepare
them for the academic rigor of a college education. For example, it was estimated that
between 10 and 25 percent of the students entering the University System in 1971-72
were lacking the fundamental skills needed to succeed in college level courses. The
Board of Regents set up the program with the following initial guidelines:
1. The Special Studies program will be implemented throughout the University
System no later than the Fall Quarter of 1974.
2. Any entering freshman scoring a combined verbal and math score of 650 or
below on the SAT will be given additional tests to determine skill deficiencies
which might require participation in the Special Studies program.
3. Institutions may specify higher standards on the SAT and the Comparative
Guidance and Placement Program of the CEEB for Special Studies participants.
4. Further testing will initially include, but not be limited to, the CGP test.
5. Courses in this program will include English, Reading, and Mathematics.
6. Students will be required only to enter the course related to their individual
deficiency.90
In his testimony during the trial, Leroy Ervin discussed that in the beginning, all
institutions with Special Studies programs in Georgia were given basic guidelines such as
these and that each institution could go beyond the minimum standards set by the Board
of Regents based on the mission of the institution and the type of students they served.
When Ervin assumed the role of Director of Developmental Studies, he saw the mission
of the department as “to not only meet the mandate of the Board of Regents in the spirit
of what Developmental Studies was created for, but we also had to look at and develop
that program in the context of the environment that we found ourselves.”91
The Developmental Studies program was an insulated office under the VicePresident of Academic Affairs. Unlike other academic units at the university, it was not
based in a school or college such as the Law School or the College of Arts and Sciences.
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Students in Developmental Studies generally had a deficiency in reading, English, or
mathematics. They spent time taking classes in Developmental Studies and within an
allotted time period of four quarters would either exit from the program into a school or
college at the university or be dismissed from the university.92 The Developmental
Studies program consisted of faculty members in the three academic areas and staff
members in a counseling component. The organizational structure in Developmental
Studies consisted of a director, Dr. Leroy Ervin, assistant directors, some support staff
members, counselors, and instructors in the various components of the program. In each
program, instructors served on year to year, 9-month contracts. In addition, an instructor
from each component was hired to serve as the administrative coordinator for their
component. These coordinators served on year to year, 12-month contracts.
As the Developmental Studies program grew, so did the connection between the
department and intercollegiate athletics. The Developmental Studies program was
intended to help minority students and students with low academic skills in reading,
English, and mathematics succeed at the University of Georgia. A result of this initiative
was that the program became the initial starting point for about 75 percent of the
University of Georgia’s 400 athletes. A majority of these athletes were also minority
students. In comparison, 5 percent of Georgia Tech’s athletes started in Developmental
Studies (Georgia Tech is a state rival in college football with the University of Georgia).
As a statewide comparison, in 1984 about 10 percent of all college students in Georgia
needed additional coursework in Developmental Studies.93
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During testimony in the trial when asked about where money from the Athletic
Association goes, President Davison acknowledged that every sport was supported by
revenue from the football team and “it even underwrites Developmental Studies since it
is a major user.”94 When he became the Director of the Developmental Studies program,
Leroy Ervin said that President Davison opposed the whole concept of a remedial studies
program at the University of Georgia. During his testimony, Davison did not confirm
this statement, but did say that the creation of Special Studies was not his decision and
stated, “that is part of your segregation plan and we were mandated to have it.”95
Davison continued to show his lack of support for the program. Following the trial
Davison continued to boast the importance of other programs and showed his deemphasis of Developmental Studies by stating, “I think what bothers me most is that
during all of this, we have focused on an important program (Developmental Studies),
but a program that is relatively small and that, indeed, does not carry the general use and
greatness of the University before it.”96
Davison was not a supporter of the Developmental Studies program, but he was
greatly concerned about the revenue generated from college football. Since a large
number of Developmental Studies students were athletes, the athletic association put
money into Developmental Studies so that the athletes in the program could stay eligible.
The Developmental Studies program wrote a grant proposal in 1980 to the Athletic
Association for the amount of $38,900. The Athletic Association gave money to
Developmental Studies to create a software program that could better track student
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performance.97 As a stipulation of the grant, the Developmental Studies program
provided the following specific services to the Athletic Association:
1. Computer data file of academic activity for all athletes enrolled in Special
Studies.
2. Tutorial program involving all athletes presently and previously enrolled in
Special Studies.
3. Daily and cumulative weekly computer reports reflecting activity of athletes.
4. Special academic/tutorial support for athletes enrolled in 100 and 200 level
courses.
5. Structured tutorial program in McWhorter Hall for days per week (Monday
through Thursday).
6. Special Regents Exam tutorials.
7. Tutorial for 100 and 200 level courses.98
By 1985, this grant increased to $200,000 and served to fund a full-scale Developmental
Studies laboratory that served athletes with the lowest levels of academic ability.99 The
large percentage of athletes who were involved in the Developmental Studies program
provided a reason for the Athletic Association to fund the program.
Promotion and Tenure
Jan Kemp was an assistant professor at the University of Georgia in the
Developmental Studies program. As an assistant professor, Kemp was on a 9-month
contract. When she was hired as an assistant professor in 1978 she was also hired as
coordinator of the English component in Developmental Studies, so the position of
coordinator changed her contract to a 12-month contract. Kemp was demoted in 1982
from the coordinator position and subsequently her contract was non-renewed. Leroy
Ervin’s contention was that Jan Kemp’s contract was non-renewed because she failed to
produce research and showed no interest in it.100 When Jan Kemp began working in
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Developmental Studies in 1976, no one in Developmental Studies was on a tenure track.
Faculty members in the department were only eligible to go through the tenure process as
part of a school or college at the university. They were considered instructors or
administrators in their capacity within Developmental Studies. In 1981, Dr. Ervin
requested that clarifications be made concerning Developmental Studies becoming a
promotion unit.101 During this same year, Dr. Ervin went up for tenure within the
College of Education and was denied due to lack of research. In 1982, Developmental
Studies became a promotion unit and Dr. Ervin was granted tenure. Ervin claimed that
Kemp had not conducted enough research during her six years of employment at the
university and that was the reason her contract was not renewed. Kemp claimed there
was nothing clear concerning what constituted enough research in Developmental Studies
and that she deserved more time since the guidelines for Developmental Studies weren’t
established until 1982. As a point of reference, Kemp was demoted from her position as
coordinator of English in February of 1982 and her contract was non-renewed in
September of 1982. Kemp’s lawyers argued that Ervin had demoted her before there
were any official promotion and tenure guidelines for Developmental Studies. The
university’s defense tried to show that Kemp should have done more publishable
research. Kemp argued that the expectation of research was not clear and that she had to
teach a full load in addition to finding time for research. There was a back and forth
argument over how much research Kemp should have done by the time she was demoted
and released. In 1981, the University of Georgia established new promotion and tenure
guidelines. At this time, the new guidelines stated that faculty members must
demonstrate significant accomplishments in two of three areas; research, teaching, and
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service. Additionally, the guidelines made exceptions for faculty members who have
assigned duties that focused on research and service, but not instruction. This became a
concern for the faculty members in Developmental Studies because their teaching load
was much larger and their focus was instruction.102
In response to these changes, William Diehl, the coordinator of the Reading
component in Developmental Studies, wrote a letter to the chair of the Promotion and
Tenure Guidelines committee, Kathryn Blake. In the letter, Diehl made a plea and
argument for the committee to modify the guidelines so faculty members in
Developmental Studies could be considered for tenure because their position was
expected to focus more on instruction. Diehl made the following argument in his letter.
Consequently, faculty members in Special Studies are engaged in a number of
research and service activities. These activities tend to be limited because of
constraints imposed by our instructional demands. Therefore, while we will
continue to engage in some research and scholarly activity, we feel that the
mission of our Division precludes the attainment of a high level of performance in
areas other than instruction.103
On August 19, 1981, Leroy Ervin sent a memo to Virginia Trotter requesting clarification
of the promotion and tenure status of Developmental Studies program. In the letter,
Ervin identified two primary issues: first, whether the division of Developmental Studies
was a faculty unit; second, whether the division qualified as a separate promotion unit.
Ervin stated in a memorandum to Trotter that “this memorandum is intended to identify
the issues and to make recommendations concerning promotion and tenure policies for
Developmental Studies faculty members.”104 Jan Kemp was demoted from her
coordinator position and she was sent a letter of non-renewal on September 2, 1982. In
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the letter, Ervin stated the following as some of the reasons for her contract to be nonrenewed.
1. Since the beginning of Dr. Kemp’s full-time employment (Sept., 1978), she
has not published any scholarly works.
2. Since Sept., 1978, she has not participated in national or regional professional
associations.
3. Since Sept., 1978, she has not presented any papers at national or regional
meetings of professional organizations.105
Kemp’s argument was that she had no reason to believe that she should be making
significant progress toward scholarly research because no official guidelines were set for
Developmental Studies. Her lawyers argued that based on Diehl’s letter in May of 1981,
less than a year before she was demoted, it was clear that there were no firm guidelines.
They then argued that Ervin’s memo to Trotter confirmed that guidelines and
expectations were not established for Developmental Studies. However, Ervin stated that
Kemp should have been making progress in the research area since she was hired in 1978.
Jan Kemp’s research consisted of putting together a textbook for teaching English
to students in Developmental Studies. Ruth Sabol, who served as the coordinator of
English following Jan Kemp, did not disagree with Ervin’s argument that Kemp had not
produced a significant amount of scholarly research. However, Sabol’s argument was
that Kemp had produced research that was the equivalent of other professors in
Developmental Studies, yet they had not been questioned to the same degree as Kemp.106
On September 2, 1985, Sabol sent a letter to her attorney asking that a memorandum she
wrote concerning issues in the Kemp case. Sabol’s memo was an indictment of Ervin
and a defense of Jan Kemp’s research. In response to Ervin’s charge that Jan Kemp’s
evidence of publication was not research, Sabol made the following argument:
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In Dr. Sabol’s view, Ervin is correct. However, Dr. Sherrie Nist, Reading chair
was recently promoted to Acting Associate Director, has just completed a book
which is being published by a major publishing house. Dr. Nist’s book, which Dr.
Sabol assumes Dr. Ervin is acknowledging as a publication acceptable in Dr.
Nist’s list of publications that will be submitted for Dr. Nist’s promotion and
tenure, is a collection of readings taken from other sources and explanations and
exercises accompany those readings. If Dr. Kemp’s exercise books, Usage Part
I and Usage Part II are not acceptable to count toward Dr. Kemp’s promotion and
tenure, why does Dr. Nist’s book, which is essentially the same kind of
publication, count toward her promotion and tenure (if indeed, it does)?107
Preferential Admissions of Athletes
An analysis of the Developmental Studies audit performed by the Board of
Regents provided in-depth information concerning the admissions and exiting of athletes
in the Developmental Studies program at the University of Georgia. Ultimately, Dr.
Ervin had full control over admissions and exiting decisions regarding the students in the
program. The program had around 300 participating students with 10 to 20 percent (30 to
60) of them being athletes at the university. Once students started in Developmental
Studies they had four quarters to complete the necessary courses to exit the program. If
they were unable to complete the necessary courses with a grade of C or better, they were
dismissed from the university. Students could appeal the dismissal and request additional
quarters to complete their courses or if their grades were not high enough. In the end, Dr.
Ervin made the decisions on these cases. Most appeals of dismissals were submitted by
athletes and in most cases, these appeals were upheld.108 The admission and exiting of
students from Developmental Studies proved to be an important part of the Jan Kemp
trial and a point of controversy between the faculty in Developmental Studies, the
Athletic Department, and the academic administration.
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In many cases, athletes were admitted with combined Scholastic Aptitude Test
(SAT) scores as low as 430 and high school Grade Point Averages (GPA) as low as 1.31.
(Not all athletes failed to meet the standard requirements for admission to UGA) In a
span from 1981-1984, 87 athletes were admitted who fell below the standards for regular
acceptance to the university and needed to be admitted to the Developmental Studies
program. However, 83 out of 87 or 95% of the athletes that were admitted to
Developmental Studies did not meet the standard requirements for admission to the
Developmental Studies program (SAT-650 and GPA- 2.0).109 These athletes went
through three separate processes to gain admission to the university.
Most students applying to the University of Georgia during this time period
needed a score of 900 on the SAT and a high school GPA of 3.0. If a student did not
meet these standards they were either denied admission to the university or denied
regular admission and referred to Developmental Studies for potential admission. At this
point in the process, athletes who did not meet the standard criteria for admissions were
automatically referred to Developmental Studies.110 It is important to note that the
NCAA considered acceptance into a developmental studies program the same as being
admitted to the university for the purposes of participating in intercollegiate athletics.
Additionally, taking classes in developmental studies met the NCAA rules where students
should be making progress toward a degree.
The Developmental Studies program had an admissions and dismissal committee
that reviewed all applications referred to them for admission to the program. After
students were referred to Developmental Studies, they were sent letters offering them an
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opportunity to be considered for admission into the program. Students could then apply
to the Developmental Studies program. Students receiving a referral then took a basic
skills examination to measure their English, Mathematics, and Reading skills. The
committee, made up of faculty members and staff members within the Developmental
Studies program, reviewed all applicants in the pool. The program had an initial cutoff
for admission of a combined SAT score of 650 and high school GPA of 2.0. However,
the NCAA only required athletes to have a 2.0 GPA upon graduation from high school to
be eligible for participation in intercollegiate athletics. After admitting students meeting
the cutoff score, the committee reviewed appeals and any other special circumstances
using a basic skills examination and other factors in their consideration. Any students
left were sent rejection letters.
At this point in the process, a student could appeal the decision of the committee
to the Vice President for Academic Affairs, Virginia Trotter. Trotter could then grant the
appeal and accept the student into the Developmental Studies program. To give an
example, for Fall Quarter 1982, 51 students were administratively admitted after initially
failing to meet the standards for admission into the Developmental Studies program.
Twenty-five of these students were athletes. In one case a student with a 1.31 high
school GPA and a 480 on the SAT was initially rejected, but then accepted by the
committee.111 Ervin created a contradiction according to Kemp’s lawyers in relation to
allowing athletes with low SAT and GPA scores to attend. Ervin co-authored an article
in the Journal of College Student Personnel in March 1985, less than one year before the
trial but after Kemp filed her lawsuit. In the article, he used current athletes in the
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Developmental Studies program as test subjects. In the discussion section of the article,
Ervin argued
What action, then, is in the best interest of the student athlete who is academically
deficient? A modification of Rule 48 that would prohibit the admission of
students who fail to meet the stated criteria on aptitude tests and high school
performance would prevent the continued exploitation of these individuals.112
Ervin supported admitting student athletes in his position and at the same time argued in
an article published in a national journal that they were being exploited. During the
Board of Regents Developmental Studies Audit following the trial, Ervin and Trotter
were interviewed together. During the interview, they were asked about the pressure they
felt from President Davison and the Athletic Association to admit extremely weak
students. The following exchange between the interviewer, Ray Cleere, Trotter, and
Ervin highlights the pressure that Trotter and Ervin felt to admit low academic students to
the point that it was considered automatic.
Cleere: All right. Let’s talk about the athletic department- Dick Copas. . .
Ervin: Copas would say, Well, you know, Vince is gonna get his way, so, you
know, I. . . he’s gonna send me to Dr. Trotter, and if Dr. Trotter says no, then he’s
going to go to the President, and he’s gonna get what he wants from the President.
Cleere: All right. Were there examples. . . and I’m not interested in the names at
this moment – were there examples where Copas could not get you to do
something with a student, could not get Trotter to do something with a student,
and the next thing you know, you’re having a meeting with the President. Did
that ever occur?
Ervin: Well, let me put it this way.
Trotter: Not overtly.
Cleere: All right. Okay.
Ervin: I think that if Dick has come to me and then he’s gone to Dr. Trotter. . .
Trotter: Many, many times. . .
Ervin: Many times. . . because- I mean, my. . .
Cleere: Concerning the admission or exiting of students. . . excuse me.
Trotter: It’s more the uh. . . I’ve only been involved in terms of the exiting.
Cleere: Oh, in terms of exiting. . .
Trotter: Uh-hum.
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Cleere: Okay.
Erving: The admissions was pretty much automatic.113
Ervin described a specific instance where he felt he had no choice in admitting an athlete.
There was one woman that we had no choice- well, she was an athlete, but she
was a non-revenue producing athlete. But the point is, is that she was going to be
taken- that was made clear. She was a [relative] of one of the most prominent
athletes.114
Ervin and Trotter both felt the President did not support their concerns about the
admission of athletes. The two academic administrators responsible for admitting these
athletes were against it and said they felt pressure from the President to allow these
students to be admitted.
In his testimony during the trial, President Davison addressed why the university
chose to support admitting students who only had a 2.0 GPA. Even though he was
outwardly touting his role in the increasing of academic standards, Davison defended
why UGA chose not to take its own stand by stating,
What we call came to a common standard that is known as the standard that we
have today and that standard was that the only requirement for participation in
eligibility in intercollegiate athletics was a 2.0 high school GPA. We all
embraced that standard even though we knew there was some risk at the time and
indeed that has proved to be there. That being the way the 2.0 came about, it was
to insure a level field of competition.115
In response to how the university could admit students at such a low academic level,
President Davison’s response was the university just accepts the problem.
We treat it differently because it is different and we have treated it different as a
society. We have given it a large—we have given it a position publicly that we
simply don’t give to anything else that a youngster does that age and, in fact we
had found that in those two sports [football and basketball] particularly there has
been absolutely no requirement for performance in the high schools. The
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question that should be asked in this sense is how does a student get out of an
accredited high school with a 2.0 HSGPA unable to read. All the university does
is accept the problem, we don’t create it, and we simply try to do the best we can
with it.116
Davison was always open and unapologetic about the fact that athletes and
specifically football and basketball players were given preferential treatment beyond that
of the regular student and even athletes from non-revenue producing sports. He focused
on the high schools. He always defended his stance on lowering standards by stating that
every university with revenue-producing football was like the University of Georgia.
“That existing pool is very narrow in football and basketball and the pressure against that
pool is national, it’s not just the University of Georgia, it’s not just Michigan, it’s not just
Michigan State and it’s relatively similar.”117
Davison also said that athletes going into revenue-producing sports such as
football and basketball were more academically deficient than students in non-revenue
producing sports.118 In an interview with Henry, he agreed that football and basketball
were treated differently. He also identified a race and class component that evolved as a
theme during this analysis. In describing the recruitment of athletes into revenueproducing sports, Henry said, “You don’t go to the ghetto to find a gymnast.”119
In response to Davison’s answer concerning why they lowered admissions
standards for athletes in revenue producing sports, Hue Henry asked the following
question,
Well, Dr. Davison, by perpetuating that system, by admitting them with lower
admission standards and so forth, aren’t we saying to the young kids in high
schools as an educator, run fast, bounce the ball, throw it a long way, push it
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through the hoop, don’t worry about your books, the University of Georgia will
let you in, lower admission standards, you are perpetuating the system, aren’t
you?120
Davison’s response to this was that the University of Georgia was not perpetuating the
system because he was involved in putting together Proposition 48. As these practices
continued on campus, President Davison was promoting UGA as a leader in athletic
reform through his involvement with decisions on national standards. President Davison
was actively involved in the creation of Proposition 48 which increased admissions
standards for athletes. During the same time as the Jan Kemp trial, the NCAA was
putting Proposition 48 into action. Proposition 48 stated that athletes must have a 2.0
high school GPA and a combined 700 score on the SAT in order to be eligible to
participate in intercollegiate athletics. Prior to 1984, athletes were only required to have
a 2.0 high school GPA to participate in intercollegiate athletics like football. Davison felt
this new rule would make a difference in academic reform of athletics. In contrast, Leroy
Ervin co-wrote an article entitled, “The Right Direction, but Short of the Mark.” In the
article Ervin and his co-authors argued that an institution’s admission standards should
apply to all incoming freshmen.121 Though these standards were still far below the
regular admission standard for UGA, Davison believed this was great progress and that
he was a leader in this movement. However, his involvement in trying to raise standards
did not change his view of preferential treatment of athletes at the university level.
While the university was pursuing this new level of academic standards for
athletes, he felt that it should not “unilaterally disarm”122 its athletic program. In the end,
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Davison was very open about the fact that lower admission standards for football players
were in place because they could produce revenue. He saw that football players had a
utilitarian benefit to the university and even if they never made progress toward
graduation, the mere fact of being exposed to the university and learning to read and
write did them no harm. This statement is evidenced in the following exchange during
Davison’s testimony during the trial:
Hue Henry: Now, that is a curious phrase you just used, unilateral disarmament.
Where did you hear that?
Fred Davison: I have been using it for five years. I have said it 10,000 times to
10,000 audiences.
Henry: You are going around the state talking about athletics in military terms?
Davison: Sure, it’s something—
Henry: We won’t have the graduates that we need?
Davison: No, it’s simply that one institution in our community can’t drop out and
survive. What we want is a level of play. That is what the NCAA is basically for,
what is—what all the rules were set up for, the number the of scholarships was
simply to equalize competitive position and that’s what we are for. We would
like to see it equalized nationally. If we can’t, we’ll equalize it in a small group.
By the way, we have been successful. Proposition 48, even though indexed, goes
into effect this year.
Henry: Mr. Davison, isn’t it a fact that these relaxed admissions standards are in
place because you want kids over there that can produce revenue?
Davison: In part.123
Hale Almand, the attorney representing the University’s interest made the
following statement in his opening statement of the trial. “We may not be able to make a
university student out of him, but if we can teach him to read and write, maybe he can
work at the post office rather than a garbage man when he is finished with his athletic
career.”124
In an opinion editorial in the UGA student newspaper, The Red and Black, Alex
Johnson, a graduate from UGA in 1984, wrote in response to an article by Davison where
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he stated that athletics had become too professionalized in high schools and that forced
the universities to be more professionalized and lower standards.
Very simply, don’t admit students who can’t do the work. But he won’t do that,
of course. There’s too much money at stake. TV money dictates lowered
standards. That’s a fact of collegiate administrative life. And that, of course, very
clearly lays the blame for illiterate student-athletes on the greed of athletic
departments and university fund-raisers.125
Davison justified the admission of athletes with below standard admission scores by
arguing that the university just accepted a problem created by high schools. He argued
that the university needed these athletes to maintain a competitive advantage and that
even if they didn’t graduate, if they were exposed to some college, they would be better
off and the university will have done no harm. Once the athlete’s were admitted, Trotter
and Ervin both said they felt and obligation to help these students.126 The exiting of these
low performing athletes became the next phase of Kemp’s concerns.
Administrative Exiting of Athletes
Kemp’s disagreement with Ervin and Trotter over the exiting of nine scholarship
athletes at the end of Fall Quarter, 1981 triggered the demotion and firing of Jan Kemp.
In this particular situation, there were ten students who came to the end of the fall quarter
in 1981 without having passed the necessary English course with a grade of C or better.
The students received D’s in the course. Fall Quarter 1981 also marked the end of their
fourth quarter in the program.127 According to UGA policy at the time, students needed
to complete their necessary course work in Developmental Studies within four quarters of
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admission to the program in order to exit and transfer into one of the regular schools or
colleges within the university.128
The following is taken from the letter written to Dr. Trotter and Dr. Ervin about
the faculty’s concerns over the exiting of students that did not pass their classes with the
required C average:
The ruling to which we object is the decision to exit fourth quarter scholarship
football players in spite of their having earned D’s rather than the C’s as required
by Developmental Studies policy for fourth quarter exit eligibility. Since the
program’s inception, fourth quarter students have rather consistently been
required to earn the C to exit; in fact, even this quarter, the decision was not
applied to all students who failed to make C’s. Another student who likewise
earned a D in the fourth quarter was dismissed. Based on this history, it seems
clear that the exit policy has been overruled this quarter only because scholarship
athletes failed to make the necessary grades and that, indeed, it was applied only
to them.129
At the end of Fall Quarter 1981, nine of the ten students in this situation were exited from
the program into the regular curriculum by administrative override by Ervin and Trotter.
An override meant that despite students not being recommended for exit by the faculty
members and not passing courses with the necessary C average, they were allowed to exit
the program by decision of Ervin or Trotter. All nine of the students were athletes. The
one student who was not exited was not an athlete.
In this particular situation, Kemp protested the exiting of these athletes and
brought the concern up in the admissions and dismissal committee meetings with other
faculty members. Other faculty members stated their concerns about the students being
exited and Kemp suggested that they write a letter of protest. At that time, Dr Ervin
stated that Virginia Trotter, Vice President for Academic Affairs, was involved in the
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decision so they should direct the letter to her. There was debate within the committee
over what the letter should say and about their concerns.
Dr Ervin arranged for the faculty to meet with Dr. Trotter. The meeting happened,
but without Jan Kemp; she had to be at a doctor’s appointment because she was pregnant
at the time. Unbeknownst to Ervin, Trotter, and the other administrators present, a
faculty member named Theresa Timmons secretly taped the meeting. During the meeting,
faculty members in Developmental Studies discussed their frustrations and difficulties in
working with athletes. They were trying to teach athletes who were reading on a third or
fourth grade level. One faculty member commented,
I taught the six, uh, that are really in question this quarter and while they did
make some progress we’re talking looking very hard for it. And every theme I
gave back was an F, occasionally an F+ because I, I felt demoralized. They
would look at them, they would come in excited, waiting for their grades, F and
finally they’d look at you and say, ‘Am I doing any better?’ And I would say,
‘Well, yes, but look where you started.’ So it’s this constant reassessment of their
abilities, and they’re constantly being put down and the easy thing would be to
give them a D or even an occasional C- and say, ‘You’ve come so far from
misspelling every word on this paper to only misspelling every third word. This
is real progress.’ But we’re putting F’s on them so in a social sense, they’re
demoralized by it.130
Hue Henry felt that this tape was one of the most important pieces of evidence from the
trial. In an interview, he commented on its importance.
Well, I think probably the most explosive evidence, and there was a lot. For
instance, a kid getting a grade for making a touchdown. I think beyond that, I
think what was most significant and explosive to the jury was the tapes. The
Theresa Timmons tapes. They were talking about these athletes like they were
manufacturing products and they were revenue producing. What had happened
was the faculty were in a uproar so Ervin and some people from the athletic
association. I think Dick Copas was there. They came to kind of mollify the
faculty in that meeting. Leroy Ervin was fairly candid about why this situation
was occurring. In the course of that conversation he was just saying things that it
was obvious that revenue production was more important than academics. That’s
130
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pretty outrageous and to admit it right there on tape during the hearing. There
saying yes, we knew they couldn’t graduate, but they are special students that
have revenue producing skills that this university needs. So the faculty are saying
to them that “so you are saying that this is a fraud, basically.” He was trying to be
candid to calm them down, but Theresa Timmons had a tape recorder.131
The conversation in this meeting reached the point of discussing the possibility of
creating a literacy component that would be a “Pre-Developmental Studies” program
where these students could get basic reading and writing and then could move into
Developmental Studies where they took classes to prepare them for the regular college
curriculum. 132 Dr. Ervin proposed that Developmental Studies create an adult literacy
program in response to helping these athletes work their way up from their current thirdgrade level of reading to a level that was comparable to the work being done in
Developmental Studies.133 Dr. Trotter’s response was the following,
I don’t even know whether it’s possible for us to do that or not. I think we can
certainly put them in a class by themselves if they seem to be having problems or
when they don’t make as much progress as other students so you don’t hold other
students back.134
Some athletes that were exited from Developmental Studies during fall quarter of
1981 fell into the category of the student described here. In reading the discussion at the
faculty meeting that was taped by Theresa Timmons, it is evident that faculty concerns
were not isolated to the exiting of these nine athletes. For example, one faculty member
commented in the meeting, “my concern is we don’t seem to see any changes on the part
of the recruiting coaches to recruit more students who are competent and recruit fewer
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students who are deficient.”135 Another faculty member argued about the difficulty in
getting students to progress to the level of a college student. “If our criteria is to make
them into college students, that’s the criteria we’re judging them by, that’s the criteria
we’re grading them by. We are constantly putting them in a bad light. Because they
can’t do that no matter what.”136 The exiting of students was very difficult for faculty
members because they worked so hard with the athletes, but they knew they weren’t
prepared for college work. Then, when athletes were exited out of Developmental
Studies without their recommendation it caused faculty members to become upset, with
Jan Kemp being the most vocal member of the faculty.
As a result of the Jan Kemp trial, the Board of Regents performed an audit of the
Developmental Studies program. The Board took a close look at the exiting of students
and isolated athletes as a variable in that investigation. The audit looked at students in
the program from 1981 to 1984. Some policies changed slightly from year to year, so the
auditors looked at each year individually. Fall Quarter of 1981 is the quarter that
included the controversial exiting of nine athletes that were highlighted in trial.
According to the policies in place during Fall Quarter 1981, students in Developmental
Studies were required to meet standards at the course, component, and program level.137
For example, in the English component, students needed to pass a class and their final
examination with a grade of B or better in the first two quarters and a C or better in the
third and fourth quarter. Students then needed to take the classes in a prescribed
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sequence based on admissions placement and lastly needed to score at least a 64 on the
Basic Skills Examination. If students failed a class with an F they were required to retake
the class. To then exit from the Developmental Studies program, the student needed to
meet similar expectations in the Mathematics and Reading components if they were
placed in those components.138
If a student was unable to exit Developmental Studies according to the policies in
place, there were other ways a student could exit the program. A student could receive an
administrative exit based on the recommendation of an instructor. In some cases, exits
were handled by Dr. Ervin or Dr. Trotter. For example, Jan Kemp’s lawyers challenged
Dr. Trotter on the stand concerning her decision to allow a member of the football team
to receive a fifth quarter to try and pass composition.139 Additionally, she directed the
department to create a one-person class for this student. Her letter was written on March
23, 1983 and stated the following,
After careful examination of [this football player’s] academic history, including
faculty verbal reports, I am directing you to exit him from Developmental Studies
effective Spring quarter. I am aware, however, that [he] still has some need for
additional work to further improve his composition skills, therefore, I am also
directing that an individualized program in composition be developed Spring
quarter tailored to meet [this football player’s] needs.140
In the Fall Quarter of 1981, the department used a standard deviation to make
decisions on exits using the Basic Skills Examination, so a student could be considered
for administrative exit if he scored five points below the benchmark score of 64. If a
student was unable to exit based on these situations, he could also appeal the decision.
The nine athletes that were administratively exited in 1981 were students that failed
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English, had reached their limit of four quarters, and had not scored above the benchmark
score on the Basic Skills Examination. Additionally, they did not have the
recommendation of the instructors to exit the program. In her testimony at the trial, Dr.
Trotter continued to state that she did not recall inquiring about the one non-athlete that
was not exited. She did remember many of the athletes and she stated that the trial and
the subsequent audit of Developmental Studies uncovered additional forms of preferential
treatment designed to assist athletes in maintaining eligibility and to help them exit
Developmental Studies.141
Faculty members who taught athletes in Developmental Studies realized that
many of these students were so far behind in the curriculum that they might not pass any
of the Developmental Studies courses. In response to this situation, the Developmental
Studies program and the Athletic Department created additional forms of preferential
treatment to assist these athletes. Faculty members taught classes with only one-student
on the roster and they were generally athletes. Developmental Studies created a
laboratory that allowed athletes at extremely low levels of academic proficiency to take
classes with one-on-one tutoring or individualized instruction. In other cases, faculty
members spent additional evening hours tutoring students to help them catch up. Jan
Kemp mentioned inviting students to her house to tutor them or going to the athletic
dormitories to tutor students.142 Coaches and academic advisors in the athletic
department advised athletes to take certain courses that would help them maintain
eligibility even if it was found those classes did not help them progress toward graduation.
The trial and the subsequent Board of Regent’s audit found that these activities were the
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norm in Developmental Studies. Additionally, it was found these activities were
supported and even expected by upper level administrators. During the trial, student
reporters for The Red and Black student newspaper told stories such as the following to
show the impact the system had on the athletes.
A 20-year-old sophomore at the University of Georgia collapses at his desk in his
McWhorter Hall room, the dormitory that houses scholarship athletes. It is just a
little past seven in the evening, and the final traces of the impressive southern
sunset can still be seen from the window of the exhausted athlete’s room.
Although it is still early, the student has found his literature for English 102
impossible to absorb. The challenging schedule has left the athlete with little
energy to devote to studying and, after a brief period of resistance, he finally falls
asleep. Another day has passed with yet another assignment undone.143
Other Preferential Treatment of Athletes
During the Board of Regents Audit of Developmental Studies programs in the
State of Georgia, Ray Cleere conducted interviews with key personnel at the University
of Georgia. Cleere was the lead auditor for the Board of Regents and was charged with
investigating Developmental Studies programs around the state of Georgia. From the
interviews, Cleere argued that the Developmental Studies program had created a
laboratory that “operated as a distinct administrative unit” within Developmental Studies.
The laboratory was designed to offer specific one-on-one tutoring and instruction to
students who came to the university at the lowest level of academic proficiency. The
entire laboratory was funded by a $200,000 grant from the Athletic Association.
Additionally, the primary users of the laboratory were athletes.144 Students who used the
laboratory were able to take their necessary requirements through the laboratory instead
of taking classes through the regular Developmental Studies curriculum. Cleere stated
143
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that “this is an unfortunate practice which has the potential to subvert standards
established for exiting Developmental Studies.”145 Cleere’s argument was that the
laboratory was essentially funded by the Athletic Department through a grant, was
primarily used by athletes, and the instructors and tutors with control of the curriculum
were paid for through the grant and thus by the Athletic Department.
Throughout the interviews, Cleere also found evidence that athletes were
receiving their academic advising through the coaches and academic advisors in the
Athletic Department. Dick Copas, who was an Athletics Counselor, told Cleere that the
work they did was a supplement to the academic advising done in the academic
colleges.146 After a review of the academic transcripts of athletes, Cleere found that they
were taking courses designed to help maintain eligibility for athletics and not to maintain
progress towards graduation. When Cleere interviewed Curt Fludd, an academic
counselor for athletes, Fludd admitted that there was a process for “assisting” athletes
with weaker academic proficiency.
No primary academic advising was done through the Athletic Department.
However, when presented with selected transcripts of academically weak athletes,
he admitted and described a process by which students were often assisted in
selecting those courses that would improve their academic standing and indirectly
maintain their athletic eligibility.147
In analyzing the interview of Dr. Marty McFadden, an academic advisor in the program,
Cleere argued that “her testimony represented a departure from Mr. Fludd’s in that she
clearly described a practice by which certain students were advised exclusively by the
Athletic Department without the involvement of assigned academic advisors.”148
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McFadden also reviewed the transcripts of athletes for Cleere and identified classes that
were considered easier for athletes. Many of these courses were upper-level courses in
the College of Education and by letting athletes take these courses, the University was in
violation of its accreditation. The following is a list of courses tagged by athletic
department advisors as easy courses. In some cases, athletes still in Developmental
Studies took these courses before exiting to the regular curriculum.
EIA 332- Industrial Arts and Handicrafts
ENT 201- Insects and Man
EPY 401- Psychology of Early Childhood
EPY 304- Learning and Motivation
EBE 401- Business Communication
EBE 507- Office Management
SED 544- Safety in Sports & Recreation
EPH 528- Sociology of Education
EAV 401- Basic Instructional Media Competencies
ECP 399- Career Development for Life Planning
HED 370- Community Health Organizations
CFD 395- Introduction to Child Development149
In Cleere’s view, the practice of allowing these students to take these classes was in clear
violation of the Board of Regents policy. However, he stated that “even more
significantly, it represents a deviation from standard practice, a compromise of the natural
sequence of the Core Curriculum, and a clear breach of the academic integrity of the
institution.”150
The Events that Led Kemp to Sue
On February 3, 1982, Jan Kemp was removed from her position as English
coordinator in the Developmental Studies program.151 After bouts with depression, the
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birth of her first child, and two attempted suicides, Jan Kemp officially filed her lawsuit
in the Superior Court of Clarke County in Athens, GA on May 26, 1982. She was filing
suit against Leroy Ervin, her former supervisor and Director of Developmental Studies at
the University of Georgia.

The charges in her complaint were the following,

1. On or about March 1982, Ervin wrote and/or caused to be written certain
libelous letters.
2. On or about February 1982, and continuing thereafter, Ervin did willfully
interfere with Kemp’s contract of employment with the Board of Regents of
the University System of Georgia
3. On or about March, 1981, and continuing thereafter Ervin did intentionally
inflict mental and emotional distress upon Kemp.
4. At all times, Ervin acted willfully, wantonly, recklessly and maliciously and in
bad faith.152
After a preliminary hearing and depositions, Kemp additionally filed suit against Dr.
Virginia Trotter, Vice-President for Academic Affairs and the Board of Regents as
defendants in the lawsuit. The trial was moved from Superior Court in Clarke County,
Athens, GA to United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia Atlanta
Division in Atlanta, GA.
The burden of proof for Jan Kemp’s lawyers was to prove that Kemp spoke out in
faculty meetings and to her supervisors about issues of great public concern. They
needed the jury to believe that her demotion and firing were violations of the First
Amendment in the United States Constitution that protects freedom of speech.153 In
essence, the lawyers needed the jury to believe that preferential treatment of athletes and
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corrupt practices in Developmental Studies related to this treatment were of great public
concern.
According to Kemp, Developmental Studies was the focus of academic corruption.
In an interview for Atlanta Magazine, Kemp stated that “she became aware, one by one,
of departmental irregularities that flew in the face of university standards.”154
Kemp challenged her supervisor Leroy Ervin and the system during her time in
Developmental Studies. Kemp’s view was that standards should not be lowered
regardless of type of student. For example, on June 30, 1978, Kemp wrote a letter to
Leroy Ervin challenging a move to lower the necessary grade to exit the English
component of Developmental Studies from a B to a C. Kemp’s argument was that if a
student got a C in Developmental Studies, they were likely to get a D in regular English
101. Kemp’s argument was supported by a professor in the English Department. In the
letter, Kemp states, “As Dr. Breme pointed out in an earlier staff meeting, English 101
failures are already extremely high for our students. Why assure more failures by
allowing an even higher number of premature exits.”155
The next year, Kemp pressed Ervin again concerning being lenient towards
Developmental Studies students. In a memorandum written on December 18, 1979,
Kemp argued that the dismissal policy in Developmental Studies was too lenient. At the
time, if students received three grades of F in Developmental Studies or two grades of F
in the same Developmental Studies course, they were dismissed from the university.
Kemp argued that students should be dismissed after two F’s at any point in time during
their experience in Developmental Studies. Kemp stated that “it is not the nature of the
154
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university that a student who can perform so poorly in such a supportive environment as
ours can survive and do well in the more competitive, less supportive world of regular
course work.”156 Ervin responded two days later on December 20, 1979 through a
memorandum. In his response, Ervin disagreed with Kemp about the leniency of the
dismissal policy having a correlation to future success. Ervin stated that “the dismissal
policy has little or no relationship as to how effective an educator is with students in a
teaching-learning situation.”157
On January 18, 1982, two weeks before her demotion, Kemp challenged the pass
and fail eligibility of athletes in an admissions committee meeting. Kemp asked, “how
can we maintain our integrity when a student has not exited but is transferred from the
program.”158 At the same meeting, Dr. Ervin responded to Kemp’s arguments by stating
that the department needed to form a policy so that exceptions to the exit policy could
only be made by Dr. Trotter, the Vice-President for Academic Affairs. From this
meeting, Kemp agreed to draft a letter to Dr. Trotter on behalf of the faculty stating their
concerns about the exiting of student athletes.159 The subsequent meetings of the
admissions committee involved the committee discussing the letter that Kemp wrote and
the issues concerning the exiting of athletes. The committee decided to send the letter to
Dr. Ervin and a copy to Dr. Trotter.
The letter was given to Dr. Ervin, but it was never sent to Dr. Trotter because
Kemp was demoted before it could be sent to Dr. Trotter. During her testimony, Kemp
156

Jan Kemp, to Leroy Ervin, 18 December 1979, transcript in hand of Hue Henry personal collection,
Athens, GA.
157
Leroy Ervin, to Jan Kemp, 20 December 1979, transcript in hand of Hue Henry personal collection,
Athens, GA.
158
Developmental Studies Department, “Minutes of the Admissions Committee,” (Athens, GA, The
University of Georgia, January 18, 1982, photocopied).
159
Ibid.

83
speculated that the letter was never sent to Trotter out of fear. “No it was never sent,
because I was demoted after that I think the other members felt that it was a result of that
and they didn’t want retaliation, too.”160 In later testimony Kemp argued that if the
university continued to give special treatment to athletes then, “students would get the
impression that they didn’t have to do the work because they were athletes.”161
On February 3, 1982, Kemp met with Ervin and at that meeting he demoted her as
coordinator of the English component. For the time being, she remained on the faculty as
an instructor and was no longer a 12-month employee. Immediately after she was
demoted, Kemp filed a grievance to appeal the decision and hired a University of Georgia
law professor, Larry Blount as her attorney. In her statement of grievance, Kemp argued
that she was removed from her administrative position due to her “long-standing vocal
opposition to division practices which, to her mind, were potentially adverse to the
program and its participants.”162 Some of the practices she spoke of were reversing
admissions committee decisions, pressuring faculty members to change grades,
overruling exiting decisions, and special accommodations for athletes. After the panel
heard Kemp’s grievance, she was informed that her appeal was denied because there
were not procedural errors involved in the demotion. Kemp was unhappy with the
decision of the panel and moved forward with her lawsuit.
Kemp felt the problems rested within the administration’s unwillingness to
change. In an interview, Kemp commented on her feelings about many of the key people
in athletics and academics. When asked in an interview to respond with her thoughts
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about Vince Dooley, she said, “I don’t know why Vince didn’t want the integrity. So I
don’t know why he picked on me.”163 In his autobiography, Vince Dooley commented
on a meeting with Jan Kemp in response to a fifteen-page letter she sent him with her
concerns about the athletic department’s involvement in preferential treatment of athletes.
In the letter, Kemp challenged Dooley on some of the practices in the athletic department.
In addition, she believed that coaches were encouraging players to write slanderous
letters about her. Dooley’s response was
About 70 percent of she was talking about was baseless. The other 30 percent of
her questions I couldn’t answer but I promised to check them out. After checking
them out, about half of those concerns had no basis either. But the remaining 15
percent of things she raised included some very legitimate problems that needed
to be addressed.164
Kemp also felt that upper-level administrators such as Dr. Trotter and President Davison
were not interested in maintaining academic integrity.
When asked about her thoughts on the role of Fred Davison, Kemp responded
with the following statement. “There was no reason for him to be there. I am pretty sure
it was about 16 times that I called him for an appointment and I finally got it. And that
was it because there were no reforms. Zilch, zero.”165
In regard to Leroy Ervin, Kemp stated during the trial that he was not her favorite
person. In response to Hale Almand’s challenge to her that it was “sort of a classic
understatement,” Kemp replied, “not entirely Mr. Almand. Through nightly prayer I
have conquered my anger and gained personal strength.”166 During an interview with Jan
Kemp, when asked about her thoughts on Leroy Ervin, she responded, “I never heard
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anything that came out of his mouth that would benefit anybody. And most of the time
he’s trying to say things to scare people away from him. And I don’t scare so easy.”167
While on the stand, Almand questioned Kemp’s motives and argued that she was
pursuing the lawsuit for monetary gain; there are a variety of perspectives on why Kemp
became the key whistleblower.
For example, the following is the exchange between Kemp and Almand when he
pressed her on why she was suing Ervin.
Almand: Now, Dr. Kemp, of course, you are asking this jury to award you
damages?
Kemp: Yes, sir.
Almand: Monetary damages?
Kemp: Yes, sir.
Almand: And you will want to convince them that your cause is just so you will
get money?
Kemp: Yes, sir.
Almand: And to that end you will say whatever is necessary to accomplish that
purpose, won’t you?
Kemp: No, sir. Money has never been my primary motivating force. Had it been,
I wouldn’t have become a teacher.
Almand: All right.
Kemp: The principles involved are far more important to me than money.
Almand: So you would be just as happy if all you got was a dollar?
Kemp: As long as the university was cleaned up, yes, sir.168
Hue Henry believed that Kemp personified the typical whistleblower. In a an article for
Atlanta Magazine in 1991 entitled “Jan of Arc,” Kemp’s lawyer, Hue Henry, described
Jan Kemp within the context of whistleblowers.
I’ve represented a lot of whistleblowers, so I’ve come to know them in my work
and they are definitely a type. From my experience, most of us wouldn’t do it.
These people are different. More often than not, they are of such strong
convictions they become abrasive. It’s not that they’re not likable people. It’s
just that First Amendment law is made by people who are gadflies. So once she’d
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decided it was a matter of principle, she was going to defend her position, the
consequences be damned.169
In a 2006 interview with Henry, he described Kemp as a tragic figure and described the
entire situation as Shakespearean. He saw the administrators as having gotten so
involved that they eventually had to fall and Kemp became consumed by the limelight.
Henry said there were at least seven or eight other people that could have come forward
and filed suit and challenged the administration. However, only Kemp pursued it. He
attributes Kemp’s persistence to fitting the bill of a whistleblower.
But everybody but Jan decided to move on, get on with their life. She’s really an
unusual person. You’ve got nine persons that could be whistle blowers, I’m just
pickin that number, it was probably 7 or 8. But one of them does it and the others
don’t. What’s the difference?170
The difference between Kemp and the others may be that the others did not want to
endure the emotional and psychological burdens that Kemp faced as a whistleblower.
Kemp faced a tremendous amount of pressure from a variety of areas. A member of the
athletic department told her that letters were being solicited that made claims that she was
a prostitute and stripped in class.171 Kemp was pregnant at the time she was demoted and
faced the thought of having her contract dropped from 12 months to 9 months. During
her deposition, she admitted that she was seeing a psychologist to help deal with the
stress.172 Kemp faced criticism and fought her own depression that she says was a result
of the events that led up to her demotion and the trial that followed. In an unpublished
autobiography, Kemp described in one night where she attempted suicide. That night she
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stabbed herself and tried to cut her wrists, but the blade hit bone and never severed a
major artery. She wrote,
Totally unconscious of any pain, I couldn’t help analyzing the events that had led
me to this point of total despair. I couldn’t organize the thoughts as they rushed
through my fatigued mind. There was the first grade changing incident and then
the nasty phone call from one of my students. I winced as I recalled his angry,
profane words. There was the illegal exiting of the nine athletes who had not
earned their passage from remedial courses into the University’s regular
curriculum. There was the protest letter I had written over this latter incident that
had seemed inspired from above. It had virtually written itself. But there had
begun the systematic harassment of colleagues who had supported me- of Annie
Ritter, of Art Stanley, of Bert Smith. Tears began to stream down my face. I
needed to sob openly but hadn’t the energy. Thank you for the tears, Lord, I
prayed. Bless your holy name.173
In the chapter, she told the story of a second suicide attempt, this time by pills. She
described how her second stay at a psychiatric hospital helped her to battle depression
and realize that she could not escape her situation, but had to fight through it. At the end
of the chapter, Kemp told how she met with Pat Nelson to officially write out her
complaint and file the lawsuit. Kemp recalled, “I was thrilled that I was able to laugh
with him, but more thrilled that I was able to reclaim the courage that had filled me when
I first realized that I had to battle the corruption that pervaded the University of Georgia
campus.174
Kemp’s personal struggles were not her only concerns outside the scope of the trial.
Kemp received hate mail, was taunted by passersby, and went through a difficult divorce.
Kemp continued to persist despite these external pressures. During a 2006 interview,
Kemp told a story of person who recognized her and almost wrecked her car. When
asked how she thought the trial had affected students, she responded,
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Well, it’s interesting, because it was right after the trial and I was driving
somewhere to get something to eat and this woman tried to wreck me. She rolled
the window down and said, you’re the one who is ruining UGA. I said, well I’ll
stop tomorrow. She said, you’re a smart ass.175
She received very few signed letters, but received one in 1989, three years after the
verdict, from a lawyer. The letter claimed that Kemp was a “disaffected person,”
“discordant,” and a “schizoid.” The letter made the following statement about Kemp:
So, why don’t you go somewhere where your personality fits in; there are plenty
of losers to choose from? I consider you to be a despicable person from you
record. Only you know what your game is. However, you are a pathetic person
whom I pity.176
Kemp did receive some praise as well. A number of articles about the case
written by reporters around the country sent notes with clippings from their paper telling
Hue Henry what a great job they did with the case. Kemp gave an example of a positive
experience in Athens after the trial. “You know, not long ago I was walking to get to this
child who was with her mother. You know who this is, it was Jan Kemp. She was so
thrilled that I had done that.”177
Kemp’s lawyer, Hue Henry sympathized with her plight and situation. He
regarded her as a prototype whistleblower and recognized the difficulties that came with
being one.
I think she is just really a tragic figure. I think the whole episode is
Shakespearean. The esteem of power and you get too big involved you fall. On
their side. And then on her side, she got so popular and well known that the
person to become obscure it is very hard to handle that. I think she was a tragic
figure. She became so well known. She did the whole thing where she went to
jail because she had violated her custody order with the divorce. As I saw all that
develop. Maybe because I am a theatre person. But other people were saying that
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this was a tragedy of Shakespearean dimension. Talking about the university and
so forth and I think she was a character.178
Kemp needed persistence and focus to continue to pursue her lawsuit. The entire process
took over three years and at anytime, she could have stopped. Kemp did determine that
there are things she wished she had done differently. The example she gave, spoke
directly to her daily function as a person:
The only thing I can say that blessed me was this. As grueling as it was, if I was
ever in a situation like that, I would have to make rules for myself. You have to
eat. You have to sleep and you have to care. And that’s it. Because others aren’t
going to care for you unless you let them know.179
At the time, Pat Nelson served as Kemp’s lawyer and associating Hue Henry, they
decided it was important to make it a federal case upon Henry’s recommendation. Henry
stated,
He came and got me because of the university litigation and plus the case was
originally in the state court, you remember that, and I had a lot of federal
experience because of my clerkship and as a public defender. Pat knew that and
was bumping into some resistance and called me and asked me what I thought
should be done and I recommended to get it to Federal court and get it out of state
court, get it out of Athens. That’s how I got involved.180
The case was moved to Atlanta and heard by Horace T. Ward. Ward had a unique
connection to the University of Georgia. He was the first African-American to challenge
racially discriminatory admissions policies at the University of Georgia, in 1950.181 The
university’s lawyer in the Kemp case, Hale Almand, argued successfully to have the
Board of Regents removed as a defendant in the case. However, Ward determined that
the case should stay in his court and in Atlanta. This meant that the jury for the case
178
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would be pulled from Atlanta and not Athens, GA. Ward’s decision to keep the case in
Federal court was for two main reasons. First, as Ward stated, “A defense of improper
venue is a personal privilege accorded a defendant. Being a privilege, it can be insisted
upon or it may be lost.”182 Second, since the pretrial work and pending motions had gone
on for two years and they had worked through discussion over the use of student grades
and information that was protected by the Federal Educational Right to Privacy Act
(FERPA), Ward determined that “the defendants have not shown that it would be in the
interest of justice to transfer this case at so late a stage in the proceedings.”183 The
original trial date had been set for August 12, 1985, but after the Board of Regents was
determined to no longer be a valid defendant, the trial was set for January, 1986. The
trial lasted for five weeks and on February 12, 1986, the jury found Leroy Ervin and
Virginia Trotter guilty on all counts for knowingly and willfully violating Jan Kemp’s
rights to free speech. The jury rendered the following damages in favor of Kemp.
Compensatory damages of $79,680.95
Mental distress of $200,000
Loss of Professional Reputation of $1
Punitive damages of $2,300,000184
Responses After the Trial
The Jan Kemp trial created negative publicity for the university. Some people
viewed the trial as a catalyst for uncovering the dark side of college football. This is
evident in articles written in local and national publications. Within the public relations
and alumni association at the university, people were concerned about the negative
publicity the trial had created.
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As an example, on April 24, 1986, the university sponsored a Loyalty Day Rally
in Atlanta. The event included concerts, speeches, and free refreshments all in an effort
to bring supporters of the University of Georgia together to show support for the school
despite the negative publicity. Trummie Patrick, the coordinator of the event described
the event in an article for the UGA Columns magazine: “This effort is intended to
demonstrate solidarity and support for the University of Georgia in light of recent
negative publicity the school has received.”185 The event tried to bring focus to the
academic and non-athletic prowess of the university. The organizers of the event
attempted to promote the university as “an international reputation as a leader in the field
of biotechnology research and its faculty in plant molecular biology is considered one of
the best anywhere.”186
Whether intentional or not, the public message put forward by the university was
that the institution was bigger than college football and its priorities were truly academic
in nature. While this rhetoric was rarely used in mainstream media such as local and
regional newspapers, it seems evident that effort was made by the institution to assure the
faculty at the university that the priorities of the institution concerned the academic
mission and the role of the faculty in its governance.
The negative public image created by the scandals was also seen through student
responses in the newspaper. A student who worked as a tutor spoke about the pressures
in Developmental Studies. “I know that exiting (over teacher’s advice) did happen
although none that I worked with. There is pressure from over the teacher’s head. The
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teacher feels the student should not be exited, and then someone says pass the kid.”187 In
a letter to the editor, a freshman student questioned the institution’s priorities and the
priorities of colleges across the country. “Colleges and universities in the United States
need to re-evaluate the areas where they spend their scholarship money; especially in the
area of athletics. Is it really more important to send a promising athlete to school, or a
promising student?”188 During the trial, an editorial in the student newspaper read,
“Clean it up.” The editorial criticized the university based on the Hale Almand’s
comments during the trial about athletes. “The insulting part came when Mr. Almand
admitted Tuesday that athletes have received preferential treatment in remedial courses.
He said some athletes come to the university unable to read and write. “Bring out the
violins, but don’t expect us to reach for a hanky to wipe away tears with.”189
Student editorials appeared in the student newspaper throughout the trial. Tommy
Sims, former editor of the Red and Black stated in an opinion article, “What we are
beginning to see now is that there is without a doubt two groups of athletes at Georgia.
The academic-athlete and the non-academic athlete. The latter group doesn’t fit in with
college and college athletics are all about.”190 Student response for the most part was
outrage. They formed organizations such as Students Against Campus Corruption.191
Student opinions were overwhelmingly in favor of cleaning up the athletic scandals. It
never happened, but one of the sequences written in a movie script based on the Jan
Kemp trial included a scene with a student holding a sign that said, “Let the Big Dawg
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Read! Thanks Jan Kemp!”192 Jan Kemp never attended a football game again to see
signs like this, but she did find that many of the students at the university supported her
cause.
The Faculty’s Response to the Jan Kemp Trial
An analysis of the University of Georgia Columns magazine and additional
newspaper editorials presented evidence of the faculty reaction to the Jan Kemp trial at
the University of Georgia. During the months and years following the case, the faculty
became heavily engaged in redefining the role of faculty members in the governance of
the university and in particular, athletics. Support for this movement seemed to come
from a change in leadership at the presidential level.
Following the trial, Davison resigned as president of the university. The Board of
Regents then announced that Dr. Henry Stanford would become interim president of the
University of Georgia. Stanford described the purpose of a university as “a critic, a
prophet, and a conscience of society.”193 Stanford’s job was to assist in improving the
public image of the University of Georgia and assessing the current administrative
structure of the institution. Stanford claimed he was a “self-appointed evangelist.”194 He
gave approximately 181 speeches around the state of Georgia in an effort to improve the
university’s public image. Stanford highlighted two goals as being prominent in his role
as interim president. First, Stanford wanted to “study decision-making on campus,
particularly the faculty’s role in the process.”195 Second, he planned “to begin a long-
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range planning process to determine where we expect to be in 10 years.”196 Following a
similar message as put forward by the public relations office about the UGA Loyalty Day,
Dr. Stanford stated that “it’s time to focus on the achievements of the university, and
move away from its mistakes, if there are any.”197 Stanford’s statement was very
strategic in an attempt to appease both sides. He assumed and recognized that mistakes
are made, even in a general sense which is a line of rhetoric that played out in the media
and within the faculty ranks.
In an effort to ensure mistakes were not made on his watch and probably to
appease the faculty and critics of the university, Stanford appointed Dr. Boyd McWhorter
to be an athletic consultant. McWhorter was a former English professor at the University
of Georgia and had recently left the post of athletic commissioner for the Southeastern
Conference. Stanford’s reasoning for hiring an athletic consultant was to have someone
serve as the coordinator of all academic activities related to athletes. In this role,
McWhorter monitored the admissions process and academic progress of athletes.
Compliance with the SEC and the NCAA and serving as a liaison between academics and
athletics were two primary components of McWhorter’s role. Stanford used the analogy
of a certified public accountant report to explain McWhorter’s role in the structure. “He
will serve as an independent academic auditor, reporting directly to me as an independent
certified public accountant reports on financial activities directly to the chief executive of
an organization.”198 Stanford went on to say that hiring McWhorter was intended to make
sure that administrators were fair and equitable when it came to addressing the needs of
student athletes in the academic realm. In his State of the University Address, Stanford
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used every opportunity to convince the faculty and critics that the University of Georgia
was more than college football. Stanford set up an environment in which the faculty and
administrators would debate over the future of the university. In his address he described
the Jan Kemp trial as,
A Greek drama as I sat in front of my fireplace in Americus, GA. The chorus
singing into my mind’s ears about the fate the Gods had willed for the actors,
seemingly puppets pulled by a string held in the hands of a deus or several dei ex
machine. Little did I realize that one of these strings was attached to me.199
Stanford also used the analogy of a laboratory rat to demonstrate the stress the institution
faced as a result of the Jan Kemp trial. “Like the laboratory rat, the university was under
the extreme stress of different experiments and external pressures. These stresses create
conflict inside the rat’s body and similarly the university faces a conflict within itself as a
result of these stressors.”200 In a plea to the faculty and the university community,
Stanford wanted to see the university overcome this stress.
Stanford viewed the Jan Kemp trial as an opportunity to re-emphasize the
academic mission of the institution. He continued to make his plea to the faculty and
ensure the academic integrity of the university with the following statement,
I have wondered how in American education, it has developed that the prestige of
a professor is in inverse ratio to the number of hours he, or she teaches. I have an
axiom that I place alongside this one: Prestige varies directly with the level of
students he teach. The higher the level, the more prestige; the lower, the less
prestige.201
However, Stanford did not offer unconditional support to the faculty. During the months
leading up to Stanford becoming the interim president, the faculty formed an ad hoc
committee within the University Council and completed a study of the governance and
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operation of the university. The University Council was then and currently is the faculty
governance organization for the University of Georgia. The committee created a report
with recommendations to Dr. Stanford concerning the governance and operations of the
university. In his address, Stanford gave an overall response to the recommendations of
the ad hoc committee. Stanford stated, “even though I do not agree with all the
recommendations for change, I am eager for the report to have the widest possible
review.” He continued to say that “reasonable people can disagree and still be respectful
of contrary notions when they are rooted in sincere conviction.”202 Analyzing the report
of the ad hoc committee on academic policies and Stanford’s responses to their
recommendations offers insight into where Stanford fell along the continuum between the
academic mission and the support of intercollegiate athletics.
In January of 1986, the University Council created an ad hoc committee to study
“the various issues engendered by the Kemp case and to make such recommendations as
it deems appropriate. The committee members were tenured members with no
administrative duties.”203 Thus, the Kemp case was a catalyst for change with the
University Council and the faculty’s role in the governance of the university. In the
committee’s report to the University Council, they stated first that the statues and bylaws
of the university and the University Council needed to be updated since they had not been
changed since 1973, a span of 13 years.
The ad hoc committee identified problems with the University Council that in its
opinion excluded the faculty from being prominently involved in the decision making of
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the institution. The committee formed the following list of problems with the University
Council and a statement of its concerns.
1. The number of administrators on the Council;
2. The climate of decision-making in which the faculty does not feel free to speak
openly about matters of concern;
3. The fact that the presiding officer of the Council is the President of the University
rather than a faculty member without administrative assignment;
4. The structure and functioning of the Executive Committee (to the University
Council);
5. The number of administrators who serve as chairs of key Council committees;
6. The number of administrators who are on key committees and in some instances
dominate the committee;
7. The absence of reference in the Statutes and Bylaws to the faculty’s role with
regard to the governance of the athletic program and the absence of reference to
the relationship between the University and the Athletic Association.204
The committee’s concerns raised two major questions, why were administrators allowed
to have overwhelming control over the governance of the institution, and why was the
role of the faculty minimal and undefined? The following statement along with the list of
problems summarized the focus of the committee.
Over the years the University Council has evolved to a point that it has lost the
respect and confidence of the faculty as a legitimate format for faculty governance,
as the recent poll of faculty opinion concerning the Council clearly indicated.
Part of this is due to the problems mentioned above, but part may be due to the
method by which items must be screened through the Executive Committee to get
on the agenda of a meeting for discussion. Several members of the Committee
who have served on the Executive Committee think this is a major roadblock to
effective faculty involvement in the University Council.205
The committee believed that the current structure of the University Council did not allow
for enough checks and balances, especially in regard to the relationship between the
university and the athletic association. For example, the University Council had a
Committee on Intercollegiate Athletics. The Chair of this committee was appointed by
the president who also served as an ex-officio member of the Athletic Association Board.
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The faculty members on this committee believed this gave the president too much control
and did not allow for the faculty to choose their representative in matters pertaining to
athletics.
The committee also produced recommendations related to admissions,
Developmental Studies, and athletics. The committee addressed the admission standards
of athletes, the private status of the athletic association, and some requests for reform.206
In regard to admissions, the committee believed that “NCAA regulations should play no
part in the admissions process at the University of Georgia.”207 They continued to
challenge the decisions of administrators, saying that “by admitting athletes who are not
capable of coping with the University’s regular academic program, the University has
done a disservice to the students involved and has compromised its integrity.”208
In regard to athletics, the committee had great concerns about the private status of
the Athletic Association. It pointed out that since the Athletic Association was a separate
corporation it did not have the same legal liability as state institutions. A powerful
example of this situation was that the Athletic Association was not subject to a state
audit.209 Since state law did not allow athletic associations to use state funds, they
became managed more like a business than as part of an academic enterprise. To the
committee, this created a problem because,
Athletic considerations can therefore be kept separate from academic
considerations. Nevertheless, despite the fiscal convenience of having a selfsupporting Athletic Association, many members of the University committee,
including a majority of the members of the committee, think that the Athletic
Association should no longer be a private corporation.210
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The faculty’s concerns about the Athletic Association being a private entity were echoed
by UGA historian, Thomas Dyer. The faculty in the University Council recommended
that the Board of Regents do everything in its power to move the Athletic Association
back under the umbrella of the university’s governance structure. Their argument for
reverting back was that at the time only 6 or 7 other schools in the country had Athletic
Associations that were separate entities. The ad hoc committee also argued that the legal
separation of the Athletic Association from the university implied that intercollegiate
athletics is different from other university activities. The committee also implied that
since the Athletic Association was a private entity, it could operate in secret unlike the
university which was required to have open records concerning all of its business. The ad
hoc committee also offered solutions or additional recommendations to these problems.
First, it felt that if the Athletic Association was to remain legally separate from
the institution, it should at least open its records for view by the public due to the nature
of its connection to the University of Georgia. Second, they proposed that the number of
faculty members serving on the Athletic Association board should increase and the
number of alumni on the board should decrease. Third, it recommended that the
assignment of football tickets primarily based on donations to athletics be changed to
account for giving to the university as a whole. Fourth, the committee requested that the
president, the athletic director, and the faculty chair for athletics work to lobby the
NCAA to prohibit freshmen from participating in intercollegiate athletics.211 This is a
similar argument made by college football scholars like John Sayle Watterson and John
Thelin. Last, the committee recommended that the use of Sanford Stadium, the football
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stadium, be shared by more than just the Athletic Association. At the time, the stadium
was only used for football games and graduation. To make their point, the committee
argued, “it is questionable whether such a valuable institutional resource in the center of
the campus should be inaccessible to the University Community some 358 days of the
year.”212
Today, the stadium still sits in the middle of campus and is only accessible for football
games and graduation. During graduation ceremonies held in the stadium, no one is
allowed on the field.
Following the University Council’s modification and approval of the ad hoc
committee’s recommendations, interim President Henry King Stanford responded to them.
In general, Stanford supported the recommendations and made few changes. However,
Stanford did not take a firm stand in favor of many of the Council’s recommendations
concerning athletics. For example, one of the Council’s recommendations stated,
“NCAA regulations shall play no part in the admissions process at the University of
Georgia.”213 Stanford did not wholly support the recommendation, but instead stated that
he “interpreted the spirit of this recommendation to be that all athletes shall meet the
established admissions standards for regularly admitted students.”214 Stanford stated that
he agreed with the spirit of the recommendation, but never committed to officially
approving it. Stanford argued that the admissions committee and the President have
authority over admissions and he did not want to usurp that authority. Stanford managed
to stay neutral throughout the transition period. However, being neutral meant he also
did not lean towards supporting the athletic department more than the academic
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departments. Dr. Bruce Shutt, the University Registrar during this time period wrote in
an article he published concerning the case that shortly after the trial, “a new Acting
President, Dr. Henry King Stanford, was appointed. From the day he took office, there
were no successful appeals from the Athletic Department to the President regarding
eligibility of athletes.”215 Stanford’s impact was felt because he did not take a hard line
in either direction. He instead allowed the faculty to become more engaged in the
governance of the university and kept the athletic department’s influence from stopping
the momentum gained from a change in regime. Additionally, Stanford’s successor,
Charles Knapp stated that “the faculty will have primary responsibility for decisions
involving admissions, academic standards and promotion and tenure policy. I will be
involved, but the executive authority rests with the faculty.”216
Before the Jan Kemp trial, the faculty’s perspective was that they were kept out of
the governance structure of the University. The trial resulted in the resignation of
President Davison and made athletic scandal a point of concern for the University. In
response to these issues, the faculty began to recommend changes through the University
Council. At the same time, an interim president, Dr. Henry King Stanford, focused on
bringing a sense of calm and creating an environment that was more a true marketplace
of ideas. The Kemp trial opened the door for the University to hire a new president who
was committed to including faculty in the governance structure and maintaining a
collegial environment. Knapp’s view of governance was, “we have to decide together
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what our future is going to be. . . I don’t want anyone to say that important decisions
were reached in secret.”217
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS
At the first intercollegiate football game between Rutgers and Princeton in 1869,
a Rutgers professor supposedly yelled at the participants, “You will come to no Christian
end!”218 This challenge and outcry from faculty members is representative of the clash
between academic supporters and athletic boosters that has become a permanent part of
the university structure and culture. For universities with revenue-producing football
programs, this clash has seen students, faculty members, administrators, and alumni and
alumnae get caught in a cross-fire. The impact of the events surrounding the Jan Kemp
trial on the people involved demonstrated this metaphor. The University of Georgia
became one in a list of many universities that fed their desire for increased revenue,
athletic success, and public prestige. Without concern for the impact it had on some of
those involved, the clash between athletics and academics left a trail of resignations,
psychological trauma, and illiterate athletes at the University of Georgia. Studying the
events surrounding the Jan Kemp trial provided a localized and personal look at how the
increased commercialization of athletics and an unwillingness to exert presidential power
and control over athletics led to the evolution of a system built on corruption and greed.
Analysis of the impact of the Jan Kemp trial identified a clear set of circumstances that
created an environment at the University of Georgia where the promulgation of college
football superseded the academic mission.
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Analysis of the literature identified themes from the most renowned reform efforts
in intercollegiate athletics, the Carnegie Report of 1929 and the Knight Commission of
1989. These reports identified presidential control, commercialization of athletics, and
corruption of the student-athlete ideal through preferential treatment.219 The themes that
emerged from the Carnegie Report of 1929 are points of concern in the decision making
of administrators at University of Georgia. Fifty years after the Carnegie Report,
commercialization of athletics at the university and an unwillingness to challenge this
goal led to a lack of appropriate presidential control by then president, Fred Davison.
Therefore, the preferential treatment of athletes persisted despite the efforts of some
faculty members and administrators to change the system. The system uncovered during
the Jan Kemp trial is similar to the events and activities described in the literature.
Robert Hutchins’ decision to abolish football at the University of Chicago in the 1930s
was the only significant instance where a university president chose academic standards
over athletic prowess. Unlike Hutchins, President Davison supported the use of college
football as a means to increase institutional prestige and commercialization at the expense
of academic integrity. The focus on the commercialization of college football at the
University of Georgia led to numerous instances of preferential treatment uncovered
during the Jan Kemp trial. The persistence of preferential treatment without any
challenge from the president put faculty members and lower ranked administrators in the
middle of a maelstrom of power and politics.
Commercialization of College Football
As discussed earlier, the influence of Walter Camp led to college football
becoming more entrepreneurial and business-like. In the 1880s at Yale, Camp
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recognized the revenue generating possibilities of college football and created a structure
that took the control of athletics away from students and put it into the hands of alumni
and administrators. Other schools followed the example of Walter Camp and Yale as
they created their football programs. The formula for success was to start a football team,
travel to play prestigious teams like Yale, Princeton, and Harvard in exchange for a large
sum of money, and use the exposure from the football team to increase enrollment. Like
other institutions, the University of Georgia modeled its program after Camp’s program
at Yale, even to the point of adopting the same mascot.
The University of Georgia modeled its campus after Yale and even adopted the
same mascot. The University of Georgia also developed a commonality with Yale by
using athletics to promote the institution and increase enrollment. The creation of the
University of Georgia Athletic Association as a private entity in 1929 coincided with the
building of Sanford stadium and UGA’s first win over Yale.
The establishment of the athletic association as a private entity allowed the football
program to operate outside the umbrella of the university and focus on the development
of the program and revenue generation without the control or input of the university.
This structure eventually created an adversarial relationship and power struggle between
athletics, the faculty, and top administrators at the university. The desire to increase
revenue and increase athletic prestige created a tremendous amount of pressure which led
to the lowering of admissions standards and preferential treatment of athletes. Tom Dyer,
John Thelin, and Hue Henry all looked at the privatization of the athletic association at
the University of Georgia as a major turning point that established the commercial
importance of football to the University of Georgia. Becoming a private entity allowed
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the football program and its personnel to work outside the control and confines of the
university. The athletic association was then empowered to bring in as much revenue as
possible to increase its chances of fielding a winning team. The educational justification
for this in 1929 was to expose the university to more prospective students and bring in
prominent faculty members. In the 1980s, there was no reason to justify the separation.
It was just considered a part of the system. The justification for increased profile of
college football was simply to increase revenue.
Generating revenue was at the core of many of the decisions made where
academic integrity was overlooked for the sake of athletic prowess. In the faculty
meeting that was secretly taped by Theresa Timmons, Leroy Ervin stated his view on the
true relationship that athletes had with the university:
I know for a fact these kids would not be here if it were not for their utility to the
institution. There is no real sound academic reason for their being here other than
to be utilized to produce income.220
The NCAA lowered the entrance requirements for athletes and UGA adjusted its
standards to meet the NCAA standards. Some athletes came to the university and could
not read or write. If not for their athletic ability, they would not be attending the
university. There is historical evidence that supports this type of preferential treatment.
In the book, The Chosen: The Hidden History of Admission and Exclusion at Harvard,
Yale, and Princeton, Jerome Karabel discusses the reasons for preferential admissions
given by a past Dean of Admissions at Harvard, Wilbur Bender:
The decisions made by Wilbur Bender described athletic ability as more than a
tie-breaker; instead it was a decided plus factor. According to Bender, to be sure,
Harvard would not admit a man, no matter how great a football player he may be,
220
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unless he is intellectually qualified and sound of character. That said, the
underlying message strongly supported athletes and athletics; Harvard, Bender
maintained, would be a poor place without football and had no intention of going
the way of Chicago.221
When Bender speaks of Chicago, he is referring the University of Chicago’s decision to
abolish football in the 1930s.
The pressure on the faculty to help athletes maintain eligibility led to faculty
members creating additional interventions because many of the athletes were at an
academic level that made it seem impossible for them to ever graduate. In the same
meeting taped by Timmons, one faculty member tried to explain that the athletes being
admitted were at such a low academic level that they might never graduate. However,
the expectation of Virginia Trotter, the Vice-President for Academic Affairs, was that
once admitted, the university and specifically the Developmental Studies program had an
obligation to help the athletes. In a faculty meeting, Trotter said,
Once we admit them, I feel we have some responsibility towards them even
though, I mean, if they’re making progress. And if uh, if they are, and even if
they’re not going to graduate, and I think we are really talking through our hats if
we think these students are going to graduate, but they could be a lot better off as
a citizen, having been through our program.222
The faculty members in Developmental Studies were told by their supervisor and the
chief academic officer that these athletes were never really expected to graduate, but were
going to be there nonetheless. Later in the meeting, Trotter made it clear by saying, “As
long as they meet the NCAA standards, we’re going to take them. I mean, that is just a
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fact of life.”223 At this point, it is clear that the chief administrators responsible for the
academic mission of the University of Georgia determined that for the sake of revenue
producing athletics, they allowed the NCAA to determine the standards for their
institution. With the decision made by Trotter, the faculty members had very little
options other than to conform, leave, or find a way to challenge the system.
In the media and during testimony, President Davison repeatedly defended the
University of Georgia’s reasons for admitting athletes below the set standards. He also
repeatedly stated that if any special treatment was given, that he did not know about it. In
contrast, Dr. Trotter stated in interviews with Board of Regents auditors that President
Davison made it clear to her directly or indirectly that they should support admitting
athletes below the established standards. Trotter recounted a conversation she had with
President Davison where the president stated that “if we’re going to compete we have to,
you know, go with the NCAA standards, and, that we have to find a way to, you know,
we need to find a way to deal with this.”224 Leroy Ervin also stated that he felt he didn’t
have a choice. When interviewed by the Board of Regents during its audit of
Developmental Studies after the trial, Leroy Ervin reiterated a statement he had made
during the trial, “it is nothing new to say that these kids were only at the University- only
for their ability to win games and produce income- I’ll say that over and over and over
again.”225 The pressure from the athletic department coupled with the president’s
unwillingness to challenge the football program led to the continuation of athletes
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receiving preferential treatment. Trotter and Ervin believed that the president was in full
support of preferential treatment and that regardless of the policies, the athletic programs
needed to keep whatever players necessary to maintain a winning edge. The plight of
these administrators demonstrated the importance of the president in decisions involving
big-time college athletics as presented by the Carnegie Report and the Knight
Commission.
The concern that losing on the field might lead to a loss of revenue created a corrupt
system of inadequate checks and balances. The Developmental Studies program was
isolated from the rest of the academic community on campus. The large influx of
influence and money the athletic association funneled into the Developmental Studies
program meant that decisions made in the program at times were based on the needs of
the athletic program. Nor did academic administrators sustain the academic mission of
the University.
Presidential Control
The two major reform efforts studied in this dissertation identified the president as
the key catalyst for change and for upholding the academic integrity of the institution.
These reform efforts have recognized that the presidents have tried to take a step back
and allow the athletics programs to develop their systems and policies outside the
university’s umbrella of control. The Carnegie Report of 1929 made the following
statement,
“many university or college presidents have left the shaping of athletic policies to
conferences, committees, or specialists in physical education, who represent not
so much the welfare of the institution and its undergraduates as special interests of
one sort or another, all of which apparently feel that material prosperity, their own
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prestige, or professional standing must be served before other ends can be
considered.”226

According to the reform efforts, the president of the university has to take control of
athletics in the same way they should take control of the academic and fiscal operations
of the institution. The Knight Commission report in 1991 argued,
Presidents are accountable for the major elements in the university’s life. The
burden of leadership falls on them for the conduct of the institution, whether in
the classroom or on the playing field. The president cannot be a figurehead
whose leadership applies elsewhere in the university but not in the athletics
department.227
These two major reform efforts established the argument that the president of the
university must be actively involved in keeping the academic mission the main priority
for the university. The president must do this in spite of the pressure that comes from
being involved in revenue producing athletics like football or the public and media
pressure that puts athletic prestige ahead of academic integrity.
The Jan Kemp trial challenged the role of President Davison and gave insights
into the pressure faced by presidents at universities with revenue-producing football
programs. Additionally, the trial showed how these pressures affected the way Davison
saw the role of college football at the university.
Previous reform efforts, including the Knight Commission’s current efforts,
involve presidential control as a key component to maintaining a balance and protecting
academic integrity. However, this focus puts an extremely dangerous burden on any one
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person who is willing to challenge and look beyond the tremendous external pressure
provided by revenue producing sports like football. Under these recommendations for
reform, the University of Georgia under Fred Davision’s leadership did little to change
the system and preferential treatment of athletes continued to persist at the institution.
President Davison was extremely involved in college football at the national and local
level. However, while he touted standards and reform within the national policy making
circles, the policies and practice at his own institution were antithetical to these reform
efforts.
Admitting athletes into Developmental Studies who functioned academically at a
level below the average at the University of Georgia and additionally feeling the pressure
to exit these students or extend their time in Developmental Studies created a situation
where other forms of preferential treatment occurred. President Davison said he knew
nothing about athletes being exited without the proper grades. During the trial, Davison
pointed to his involvement in the development of Proposition 48 as proof that the
university was focused on increasing the standards.
President Davison wanted to see the NCAA raise the academic standards for
athletes, but he did not want UGA to lead that charge. He only wanted to raise the
university’s standards if competing universities raised their standards. When faced with
the intersection of giving athletes preferential treatment or not, UGA’s reason was clear.
Athletes have a monetary value to the institution. They are a product that brings money
and that is worth lowering the GPA requirement 1 point or more and foregoing the use of
the SAT. The commercialization of football played a tremendous role in the admission
of athletes at UGA. This pressure, supported by the president, created the difficult
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decisions that administrators like Leroy Ervin and Virginia Trotter had to make.
According to the organizational structure, Ervin had the ultimate decision making power
for Developmental Studies admissions, but he never felt that way. In an interview during
the Board of Regents audit of Developmental Studies programs in the state of Georgia,
Ervin described one instance where he felt he had no choice in admitting an athlete.
There was one woman that we had no choice- well, she was an athlete, but she
was a non-revenue producing athlete. But the point is, is that she was going to be
taken- that was made clear. She was a [relative] of one of the most prominent
athletes.228
In a joint interview with Dr. Trotter, Ervin described how he received pressure from the
athletic department.
[Dick] Copas would say, Well, you know Vince [Dooley] is gonna get his way, so,
you know, I . . . he’s gonna send me to Dr. Trotter, and if Dr. Trotter says no, then
he’s going to go to the President, and he’s gonna get what he wants from the
President.229
During the interviews, Ervin felt that he was caught in the middle. He was expected to
deliver the message to faculty members on admissions exceptions and exiting overrides.
Even if he disagreed, he felt there wasn’t an option without directly defying the President,
Vice-President for Academic Affairs, and the Athletic Director.
Davison’s real views on college football at the University of Georgia may never
be known, but Virginia Trotter recalled an exchange when she was interviewed during an
audit of Developmental Studies programs throughout the state of Georgia following the
Kemp trial. She said that he never pressured her to exit students or give preferential
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treatment to athletes, but he would make statements to her like, “if we couldn’t exit the
students, then we could just play high school football.”230
During an interview, Hue Henry shared his view on the current state of
intercollegiate athletics at the University of Georgia. Henry’s response was,
I think it’s a mess. I think we addressed flat out corruption in the Kemp trial. I
don’t think we addressed it and it wasn’t appropriate for us. The systemic
problems have never been addressed. I was really disappointed to see the
standing of athletes today. In fact, in today’s paper the graduation rates are falling.
I mean, did we forget. [laughs] Apparently so, I mean that’s been a long time. It
will be 20 years this past year.231
Today’s college athletics programs still evidence Howard Pritchett’s list of evils.
Many coaches today make more money then the president of the university. Revenues at
big-time college athletic programs are at an all-time high. Athletes in football, basketball,
and other sports to some extent have separate dining halls and fly charter planes to
participate in their sport. Instances of drug use, violence, and academic misconduct put
universities in the news on a regular basis in relation to their football program. Watterson
claimed that “the interplay of costs and revenues drove big-time gridiron powers to go all
out to create powerful and profitable teams.”232 The desire to create a profitable team is
exactly what led the University of Georgia to support athletic initiatives regardless of
how they affected the institutions academic perception and policies.
During the trial, Davison acted as if he had no knowledge of the decisions being
made by his chief administrators. Trotter and Ervin both vehemently contended that
Davison knew about the decisions to exit athletes and other forms of academic corruption.
Davison tried to cover this issue by continuing to argue about his involvement with the
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NCAA in crafting Proposition 48, which was another attempt at reform. However, it is
difficult to believe that Davison was not aware of and involved in decisions about athletes
as he claimed during the trial. Davison had a history of micromanaging the faculty and
staff at the university. Hue Henry told of stories where Davison directly involved himself
in decisions to close down lab experiments and to personally ban Henry from speaking on
campus. In his early years as president, he did not allow students to protest the war in
Vietnam. Additionally, Davison continuously spoke of how he was leading the charge in
athletic reform and that once they made changes nationally, the university would change.
Despite all of the rhetoric surrounding Davison’s real involvement in academic
corruption at the University of Georgia, it is Davison’s inaction when it came to the
issues in the Jan Kemp trial that offer insight into the greatest concern for future reform
efforts.
Like presidents before him at UGA and other universities, Davison never looked
to his own campus as a catalyst and canvas for reforming college football. He used the
argument that other schools do it, so UGA is just like them. Davison never considered
putting the academic mission ahead of all other needs. He concerned himself with the
utilitarian benefit that athletes brought to the university. Instead, he blamed high schools
for not preparing the athletes for college. He asked Trotter to find ways to keep athletes
eligible or the university may be forced to play high school football. With this lack of
support from the president, any meaningful attempt at reform at the University of Georgia
most likely would be in vain.
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Recommendations for Future Research
One area to consider for future research is to compare the state of athletics at the
University of Georgia between 1986 and now. As is likely with any crisis, some
immediate changes occurred within the faculty senate and in some procedures. However,
an important question is: what long term effect, if any, has the athletic department and the
university seen in relation to the trial. The issues seen at the University of Georgia are
not isolated events. Every year, universities around the United States face scandals
related to the interplay of athletics and academics. The reality is that college football is
big business.
Murray Sperber argued this point in his book Beer and Circus. Sperber compared
college athletics to a business. Sperber argued that universities are running athletic
departments like a business and thus lacking any regard for the academic well-being of
athletes.233 With the amount of money involved in revenue-producing athletics, any
substantive challenge to the current athletic structure must address the revenue issue.
Therefore, the main reason reform efforts have failed and will continue to fail is that the
majority of universities and the presidents leading them will not make major changes if
they believe changes will impact revenue in a negative way. So despite all the corruption,
preferential treatment, publicity, and more, money is the driving force that allows athletic
departments and football programs to maintain their power and connection. This offers
another question for future research: Can efforts to reform college football make a
difference on a very small and local level if they have a certain level of notoriety and
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people willing to sacrifice themselves physically and mentally for challenging the athletic
association?
The stress and pressure that Jan Kemp endured is something to be studied closer.
Hue Henry felt that Kemp went through a whistleblower syndrome. While there have
been studies of whistleblowers in corporations, one way to understand the psychological
and physical impact of corruption is to look at whistleblowers in college athletics. Kemp
tried to kill herself as a result of the trial, faced continued stress from the decisions made
in Developmental Studies, and faced a ruined marriage as a result of her experience. If
Kemp’s experience is an indicator of what a person must go through to challenge a
system as powerful as college football, it is not surprising that few people choose to fight
as long and as hard as Kemp.
The other psychological impact to consider is that of the athlete and the impact
race has on the decisions of administrators as well. Throughout this analysis, many of the
discussions surrounding these athletes focused on students who were illiterate,
unmotivated academically, and who more than likely never graduated. A majority of
these athletes were African-American. What is the impact of the system on these athletes?
In the case of the University of Georgia, the data showed that these athletes were
considered of a utilitarian benefit to the institution. Leroy Ervin is African-American and
was in a position to challenge the system, but felt he had no choice due to the power and
influence of athletics and the lack of support he received from the President. Ervin
highlighted the racial component in the meeting secretly taped by Teresa Timmons:
We try to teach them there but there is no way to do it. The majority of these kids
are black that are coming in, and it kind of rips at me at the insides and I take it
very, very, personal. I know for a fact that these kids would not be here if it were
not for their utility to the institution. They are used as a kind of raw material in
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the production of some goods to be sold as whatever product, and they get
nothing in return.234
They are the major producers of the revenue, but they receive the least amount of
resources and support from the institution. Another study could take a closer look at how
athletes respond to the system. What happens to them after football? Do they become
postal workers instead of garbage men as Hale Almand suggested during his opening
statement?
The Challenges of Athletics Reform
Considering what Kemp went through during her experience at the University of
Georgia, it is disheartening to consider that her efforts were in vain. However,
graduation rates for football players at the University of Georgia are still around 48%.235
The athletic association is still a private entity that controls the program outside the
umbrella of the institution. The university has faced violations and scandals in basketball
as recently as 2003. Unfortunately, it appears that the Kemp trial did not have the effect
of completely reforming college athletics.
It is hard to imagine a scenario where universities would risk losing fans and thus
revenue in exchange for focusing on academic prowess. Even in the situation at the
University of Chicago where the president abolished football, he was only successful
doing so when the team was losing and the program was not as financially beneficial.
Thelin suggested that reform efforts ought to focus on controlling participation of athletes
so they cannot play during their freshman year.236 Watterson thinks that the faculty
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should be more involved in the control of athletics.237 Sperber argues that college
athletics should be made professional and be only affiliated with universities in name. 238
The athletes would not be students and the athletic association would receive no benefits
of being a part of the university. In the current scenario, reform efforts continue to offer
adjustments to the core issues in college football. However, the two main themes
presented in every major reform effort remain at the core, commercialization and
presidential control.
Reform isn’t where universities and the NCAA should focus energy. Instead, the
focus needs to be on slowly coming to terms with the realization that football will remain
a powerful influence at universities as long as generating revenue is important to
universities. In a capitalist economy, the generation of revenue may never become a
secondary concern for institutions. Therefore, institutions are left with modifying the
system towards a goal that satisfies the supporters of unwavering academic integrity and
athletic boosters. The experience of the actual athletes during and beyond college needs
to be the focus of research and reform in college football. Utilizing data on the quality of
life of the majority of athletes, not just the privileged few who go on to play
professionally, can provide needed information to make better decisions concerning
athletic programs and the students who participate in them.
A final observation concerns another possible avenue of reform. As it stands now,
the crux of the issue comes down to justifying the lowering of academic standards to
accommodate athletes. In reality, many of these athletes would never be able to attend
the universities where they play football without an athletic scholarship. However, if
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these universities began forming partnerships with community and technical colleges to
allow athletes the option to major in an associate degree level technical program there
would not be the issue of the athlete being unable to meet the academic standards. For
example, the University of Georgia and Athens Technical College are both in the same
town. If the two institutions merged, athletes could major in associate degree programs
like welding and graphic design. They would be able to take classes at an academic level
they are prepared for at the time they start college. In the event they are unable to
continue playing football after two or three years, they would more than likely have
completed a program that affords them the knowledge of a trade that allows them to
attain employment after college. Additionally, if they do grow academically, they could
continue in a bachelor’s degree program at the university. Since most technical and
community colleges have open admissions, this would eliminate the need to lower
standards and fill spots in the university with athletes. These spots could be filled by
students with the academic credentials to go directly into bachelor’s degree level work.
Unfortunately, college football has evolved to a point where no matter how genuine a
reform effort may be, it has little chance of changing the current system. Instead,
institutions continue to tweak and modify the current structure without making significant
changes.
The Jan Kemp trial offers an in-depth look into the negative impact revenue
producing athletics had on one university and a large number of the people involved.
Kemp’s story is important because it offers a glimpse into the issues that future
administrators must consider as they work with revenue-producing athletics like college
football. In 2008, Georgia State University officially started a football program. The
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university will spend 7 million dollars to start the program. Carl Patton, president of
Georgia State University, spoke about why football was started at Georgia State. “I’d
talk to students and they all said we want a real university and when they said real, they
meant football.”239 Patton’s view of football at Georgia State is indicative of the
perception that Doug Toma argued in Football U.240 As Georgia State develops its
football program, the chief administrators and primarily the president must make difficult
decisions early on about what influence football will have on decisions concerning the
academic mission. Heeding the warning signs that evolved from the Jan Kemp trial may
help them avoid the same pitfalls as they face the real challenge of balancing football
with academic integrity.
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The Effects of the Jan Kemp Affair on the University of Georgia
Interview Questions
These questions serve as a guide for each interview. In some cases, additional
questions may be asked or questions may be deleted depending on the direction of the
interview and/or the perspective the participant may bring to the research.
Personal Information
1. Could you please give me some basic background information about yourself—
your full name, date and place of birth, education, career portfolio, your current
occupation?
2. During what time frame were you employed at the University of Georgia?
3. Tell me about your role(s) at the University of Georgia while you were employed
there.
View of Intercollegiate Athletics and College Football
4. Describe to me your general views on intercollegiate athletics and specifically
college football.
5. Tell me your thoughts and feelings when I say the term, student-athlete.
6. Describe for me your thoughts on the past and current attempts to reform
intercollegiate athletics.
7. Some people might say that college football has an extremely large amount of
power and influence on college campuses. What do you say in response to that
statement?
Perceptions of College Football at the University of Georgia
8. Share with me your perception of college football at the University of Georgia.
9. Describe your perception of college football players at the University of Georgia
10. At the University of Georgia, how does college football relate to the rest of the
institution?
11. At what level, if any, do you participate in college football experience at the
University of Georgia?
12. How does the general student body react to college football at the University of
Georgia?
Perception of the Campus Environment and the Jan Kemp Affair
13. Describe the campus environment before the Jan Kemp case. How did it change
during the trial? Please share your thoughts on how the environment has changed,
if any, since then.
14. Describe your memories of the Jan Kemp affair at the University of Georgia.
What was it like? How were you involved in the situation? How did you respond
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when you learned of the case? What did it make you think about the University
and college footballl?
15. How did the Jan Kemp affair affect student-athletes? General student body?
Faculty? Staff? Alumni?
16. Tell me your thoughts on the following key figures/departments in relation to the
Jan Kemp Affair.












Jan Kemp
Virginia Trotter
Leroy Ervin
Fred Davison
Vince Dooley
Hue Henry/Pat Nelson- attorneys for Jan Kemp
Hale Almand- attorney for the University
Developmental Studies
Athletics Department
Faculty
NCAA

Conclusion
17. What factors and influences created the Jan Kemp trial? Why?
18. How did the Jan Kemp trial affect the University and athletics in the years
following the settlement?
19. What consequences if any, has the University faced for being involved in
improprieties?
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Georgia State University
Department of Educational Policy Studies
Informed Consent
Title:
that Led to Reform
Principal Investigator:

I.

The Jan Kemp Affair at the University of Georgia: A Challenge

Dr. Philo Hutcheson, P.I.
Michael Fulford, Student P.I.

Purpose:
The purpose of the study is to investigate the effects of the Jan Kemp affair on the
University of Georgia. You have been asked to participate in this study because
of your unique knowledge of the case and its effects on the University of Georgia.
Participation will require a minimum of 1 hour of your time and based on your
responses may take up to a maximum 3 hours . In addition, you may be asked
some questions beyond the interview time in order to clarify answers.

II.

Procedures:
If you decide to participate, you will meet with Michael Fulford and answer
questions related to the Jan Kemp affair and its effects on the University of
Georgia. The following is a synopsis of your involvement in this study:
1. We will meet at a location of your choice.
2. The duration of the interview will be a minimum of 1 hour but may
go longer to a maximum of 3 hours dependent on your
involvement and the answers you give.
3. You will be interviewed only by Michael Fulford
4. The interview will involve you and Michael Fulford only.
5. The interview will be recorded for analysis purposes and to ensure
accurate communication of your answers in the study.
6. At any point in time, you may end the interview simply by saying,
“I need to stop here.”
7. The interview will consist of open ended questions related to the
Jan Kemp and its effects on the University of Georgia.

III.

Risks:
In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal
day of life.

IV.

Benefits:
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Participation in this study may not benefit you personally. Overall, we have to gain
information about the effects on the Jan Kemp case on the University of Georgia to
better understand how intercollegiate athletics effects educational institutions and
to understand reform efforts.
V.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:
Participation in this research is voluntary. You have the right to not be in this
study. If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the
right to drop out at any time. You may skip questions or stop participating at
any time. Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled.

VI.

Confidentiality:
Due to the nature of this study, the information you provide in your interview will
be used in the analysis. Since your perspective is specific and vital to the success
of the study, your name will be attached to your answers whenever they are used
in the study in order to give you proper credit for the answer and for purposes of
validity. If there is any information you disclose which you want to be kept
confidential, identify that information and the researcher will not use that
information in the study.

VII.

Contact Persons:
Contact Michael Fulford at 678-376-5441 or michael_fulford@talkamerica.net or Dr.
Philo Hutcheson at phutches@gsu.edu if you have questions about this study. If you
have questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research study,
you may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at 404-4133513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu.

VIII.

Copy of Consent Form to Subject:
We will give you a copy of this consent form to keep.
If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please sign below.

____________________________________________
Participant

_________________
Date

_____________________________________________
Principal Investigator or Researcher Obtaining Consent

_________________
Date

